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Modern Maritime 
Neutrality Law 
 
James Farrant 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation is a fundamental reappraisal of the rules of maritime neutrality, including 
blockade, contraband and maritime zones. It is one of the most comprehensive 
reassessments of this area of the law since R. W. Tucker's seminal work published in 
International Law Studies in 1955. The piece traces the history and development of maritime 
neutrality rules, which are notoriously unclear, and states them as they apply today, taking 
into account technological advances and force structures where relevant. Where the law is 
uncertain, or in the view of the author unsatisfactory, this dissertation offers 
recommendations for the law’s future development. The piece also examines how maritime 
neutrality rules have been affected by the development of the jus ad bellum since the 
adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, and offers an assessment of how States reconcile 
their duties under the Charter’s use of force provisions and their traditional rights and 
duties under maritime neutrality law. It is hoped that this holistic approach will inform the 
drafting of future editions of State law of armed conflict manuals. A version of this 
dissertation was published in its entirety in International Law Studies (90 INT’L L. STUD. 
198 (2014)). 
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Modern Maritime Neutrality Law 
 
 
 
 
James Farrant* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like Mark Twain, rumours of the law of neutrality’s demise are an exaggeration.1 The 
rumours surfaced forcefully after the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945. There are still 
those who occasionally perpetrate them.2 Yet national law of armed conflict manuals and 
several recent non-State manuals rely heavily on traditional maritime neutrality law. 
Principles of neutrality law are also asserted in relatively new areas of legal regulation, such 
as air and missile operations and cyber warfare.3 Neutrality’s traditional “mustiness” has 
been superseded by a new vibrancy, which makes a detailed understanding of the rules and 
the principles they defend ever more important.4 
Commentators have long observed that the law of maritime neutrality has rarely been 
settled: not only were the rules alleged to be musty, but also murky.5 The most recent 
significant treaties governing neutrality law, Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)6 and Hague 
Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War 
                                                                                                                                               
* Lieutenant Commander James Farrant is a barrister serving in the Royal Navy. The views expressed in 
this dissertation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK Ministry of 
Defence or the UK government. 
1. Frank M. White, Mark Twain Amused, NEW YORK JOURNAL (June 2, 1897) (quoting Mark Twain “The 
report of my death was an exaggeration” following the publication of newspaper reports that he had died). 
2. See, e.g., Kevin J. Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda and It’s a Good 
Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 115, 136 (2011).  
3. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR 
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter AMW 
MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013). 
4. Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment, 14 AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 83, 84 (1998) (“neutrality has a slightly musty quality”). 
5. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 383–99 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1921) 
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM VOL. II]. 
6. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V]. 
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(Hague XIII)7 were agreed in 1907. The latter Convention, in particular, was a far from 
comprehensive statement of the law. It included no provisions on the law of blockade, 
contraband, prize law or belligerent visit and search rights. This was a consequence of 
irremediable disagreement between States at the Second Hague Peace Conference.8 A more 
detailed attempt at codification of the law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality was 
made at the London Conference of 1909. The resulting Declaration of London was 
intended to be a code for application in an international prize court. Looming war in 
Europe and hostility to the Declaration in, ironically, London meant that it would never be 
ratified and the international prize court never became a reality.9 Throughout this 
dissertation, the law up to the 1909 Declaration of London will be referred to as the 
traditional law. 
Before examining the substantive rules of maritime neutrality, this Introduction must 
set some parameters. It therefore briefly defines the three broad principles of neutrality 
law, which inform the substantive rules of maritime neutrality. Next, it assesses when and to 
whom the law of neutrality applies. The Introduction then describes some of the sources 
relied upon throughout this dissertation. 
Given how much has changed in the 105 years since the Declaration of London was 
drafted, it is perhaps surprising that the three broad principles which underpinned its 
provisions governing the conduct of neutrals are still reflected in modern military manuals. 
First, as between belligerent and neutral States, prima facie, the law of peace is applicable.10 
Second and third, the interrelated principles of impartiality and abstention guide the 
neutral’s conduct towards the belligerents. The duty of impartiality is one more of form 
than substance. In the context of trade, for example: “‘Cash and carry’ policies are 
legitimate even if one of the warring powers cannot get together the cash or is prevented 
by geography from doing any carrying.”11 The duty of abstention requires neutral States not 
to involve themselves in the hostilities. When resort to war was a question of policy 
                                                                                                                                               
7. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague XIII]. 
8. See, e.g., the remarks of Mr. Martens on September 24, 1907 in respect of contraband. 3 THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 1111 (James B. Scott ed., 1921) [hereinafter HAGUE 
PROCEEDINGS VOL. III]. 
9. STEPHEN C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS—A GENERAL HISTORY 141–42 (2000). 
10. Committee on Maritime Neutrality, International Law Association, Helsinki Principles on the Law of 
Maritime Neutrality, in 68 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE 68TH CONFERENCE, TAIPEI, 
1998, at 496, princ. 1.3 (1998) [hereinafter Helsinki Principles]. 
11. Vagts, supra note 4, at 93. 
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unfettered by legal restraint, this duty made little sense because the neutral State always had 
the right to “throw up neutrality” and join the war.12 However, it is unquestionably a 
relevant duty since the establishment of the prohibition on the use of force.13 This 
prohibition, widely recognized as jus cogens, forbids a neutral State from abandoning 
neutrality and joining the conflict. Accordingly, the duty of abstention is arguably stronger 
now than it was in 1909. 
While the U.N. Charter reinforces the neutral duty of abstention, other rights and 
duties of neutral States may be displaced if the Security Council takes action under Chapter 
VII. Article 25 requires Member States to accept and carry out Security Council decisions. 
Article 103 provides that where there is a conflict between a State’s Charter obligations and 
its obligations under any other international agreement its Charter obligations prevail.14 
During the First Gulf War in 1991, Switzerland felt compelled to take part in economic 
sanctions against Iraq, even though not yet a member of the U.N. and officially neutral.15 
Should the Security Council make a determination under Article 39 that an act of 
aggression by one State against another has taken place, it is likely that the combined effect 
of Articles 25 and 103 is to exclude rights and duties under the law of neutrality 
altogether.16 As the Security Council has yet to make such a determination, this remains a 
purely theoretical position. It goes too far to say, as one recent commentator has, that “the 
adoption of the UN Charter has rendered the law of neutrality’s rules governing the use of 
force essentially obsolete.”17 
Having observed the broad principles, the next issue is when the law applies. Some have 
argued that the law of neutrality operates only in time of war and that during international 
hostilities which fall short of war, neutrality law does not apply.18 However, the better view 
is that the threshold for applicability of neutrality law is the same as that for the existence 
of an armed conflict. This reflects the views of States in the national manuals consulted 
throughout this dissertation, which are listed presently. 
                                                                                                                                               
12. OPPENHEIM VOL. II, supra note 5, at 421. 
13. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
14. Id., art. 103. 
15. Dietrich Schindler, Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community, 
14 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 155, 162 (1998). 
16. Id. at 165. 
17. Heller, supra note 2, at 136. 
18. Michael Bothe argues that neutrality only applies in armed conflicts of “significant scope.” Michael 
Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 549, ¶ 1106 
(Dieter Fleck ed., 2008). 
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The last introductory question is to whom the law applies. The rules of maritime 
neutrality primarily address measures and controls which belligerents may enforce against 
merchant vessels of neutral character. These must be distinguished from vessels of friendly 
character, that is, vessels of the same nationality as the enforcing belligerent. The 
relationship between belligerent warships and vessels of the same nationality is a matter for 
the domestic law of that State. Vessels of neutral character must also be distinguished from 
vessels of enemy character. The law of naval warfare allows a belligerent to capture enemy 
merchant vessels as of right.19 Neutral merchant vessels, however, may only be subject to 
belligerent interference where the law of neutrality provides a specific justification. 
Historically, there were two approaches to distinguishing between enemy and neutral 
vessels. The Anglo-American focused on the domicile of the owner, whereas continental 
European States preferred to use the owner’s nationality as the defining criterion.20 The 
dichotomy has never been resolved as a matter of international law and as late as 1950 
domestic prize courts grappled with which was correct.21 
In the Parts assessing the substantive rules of maritime neutrality, this dissertation will 
routinely refer to four national law of armed conflict manuals, which have been chosen to 
provide as broad a perspective as possible: Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed 
Conflict (2004) (UK Manual)22; the United States’ The Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations (2007) (NWP 1-14M)23; the German Rechtsgrundlagen für den 
Einsatz von Seestreitkräften (Commander’s Handbook – Legal Bases for the Operations of 
                                                                                                                                               
19. See infra Part Five. 
20. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part I, The 
Traditional Law, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 291 (1991) [hereinafter Heintschel 
von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I]. 
21. The Hoegh de Vries, a decision of the Egyptian Prize Court sitting at Alexandria, summarized the two 
approaches before adopting the Anglo-American approach on the grounds that even where an owner is 
neutral by nationality, if he resides in an enemy territory “the goods are a source of wealth to the enemy 
State.” The Court also concluded that the Anglo-American approach was the “one most generally accepted.” 
The Hoegh de Vries, 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 447 ((Prize Ct. of Alexandria 1950) (Egypt)). 
22. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
(2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. 
23. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB 
P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007) [hereinafter NWP 
1-14M]. 
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Naval Forces) (2002) (German Commander’s Handbook)24; and the People’s Liberation 
Army (Navy) Operational Law Handbook (2006) (Chinese Manual).25  
Three other sources will regularly be cited and warrant explanation. The San Remo 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea26 published in 1995 is a 
restatement of the law drafted by an international group of experts convened by the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law.27 The Helsinki Principles on the Law of 
Maritime Neutrality28 were published in 1998 by a group of experts convened by the 
International Law Association.29 Third, a group of experts at Harvard University convened 
to assess the impact of belligerent conduct in the First World War on the law of maritime 
and air neutrality. They wrote the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States 
in Naval and Aerial War (Harvard Draft Convention) and lengthy commentary purporting 
to update the 1909 Declaration of London after its abandonment during the First World 
War.30 Published in 1939, it has been described as “the most comprehensive summation of 
the law of neutrality in the interwar period,” which “remains unsurpassed to the present 
day.”31 
The dissertation will proceed in six Parts. The first will assess the rights and duties of 
belligerent vessels in neutral territorial seas, and the rights and duties of neutral coastal 
States. Part Two analyses what use belligerent vessels may make of neutral port facilities—
in particular, for resupply and repair. Part Three addresses the controls that belligerents 
may place upon trade with their enemy, and how far these controls may be enforced 
against neutral merchant vessels. Part Four examines a belligerent’s ability to deny neutral 
merchant vessels use of areas of the sea by three devices of the law of naval warfare: 
                                                                                                                                               
24. GERMAN NAVY, BUNDESSPRACHENAMT – REFERAT SM 3 AUFTRAGSNUMMER 2002U-01441, 
KOMMANDANTEN HANDBUCH – RECHTSGRUNDLAGEN FÜR DEN EINSATZ VON SEESTREITKRÄFTEN (2002) 
[hereinafter GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
25. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (NAVY), OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2006) [hereinafter CHINESE 
MANUAL]. The Chinese Manual provides an important perspective, but treats some topics in less detail than 
the other manuals. Where footnotes in this dissertation contain references to all manuals except the Chinese, 
it is because the Chinese Manual does not specifically address the issue under discussion.  
26. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise 
Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). 
27. Id. at 46–55. 
28. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10. 
29. Id. at 496. 
30. Philip C. Jessup (Reporter), Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, 33 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 167 (1939) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention with 
Commentary]. 
31. NEFF, supra note 9, at 174–77. 
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blockade, maritime zones and the right to exclude shipping from the vicinity of naval 
operations. Part Five considers “unneutral service,” a catch-all collection of other ways in 
which a neutral vessel might promote the cause of one belligerent over another. Finally, 
Part Six takes a holistic look at the means by which belligerents enforce the rules of 
maritime neutrality. 
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PART ONE: PASSAGE RIGHTS IN TERRITORIAL SEAS 
 
Article 3 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
provides: “Every State has the right to . . . territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve 
nautical miles.”32 The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the territorial sea, the 
airspaces above and the seabed and subsoil below.33 Coastal State sovereignty is exercised 
subject to UNCLOS and other rules of international law.34 One important limitation on the 
coastal State’s sovereignty in its territorial sea is that vessels of all States enjoy certain 
passage rights. Depending on the particular passage right, the coastal State may have very 
little—or no—authority under international law to impede or restrict it. After briefly 
examining the general rules governing passage rights, this Part addresses to what extent 
belligerent States’ vessels enjoy passage rights in neutral territorial seas, and to what extent 
neutral States’ vessels enjoy them in belligerent territorial seas. 
Four separate passage rights are exercisable in a coastal State’s territorial seas: innocent 
passage, transit passage, straits innocent passage35 and archipelagic sea lanes passage. These 
are set out as a matter of treaty law in UNCLOS. UNCLOS has 166 State parties which 
include—with one notable exception, the U.S.—the vast majority of coastal States.36 The 
U.S. considers all of the navigational provisions reflective of customary international law.37 
Despite UNCLOS’ broad ratification, this position remains controversial. The more widely 
accepted view is that only innocent passage and straits innocent passage are strictly 
applicable between non-parties to the Convention.38 
                                                                                                                                               
32. United Nations Law of the Sea Convention art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1144 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS]. 
33. Id., art. 2. 
34. Id., art. 2(3). 
35. There are several varieties of straits innocent passage, but they may be dealt with together See NWP 
1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.3. 
36. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the implementation of 
Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to the 
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS 
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Status of 
UNCLOS]. The United States is the most prominent non-party. 
37. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 1.2. 
38. See James Kraska, Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz, VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(forthcoming 2014); Nilufer Oral, Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the 
Passage of Oil Tankers, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue /16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-
iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage. Iran, a non-party to UNCLOS, considers that vessels from States 
13 
 
 
Innocent passage applies in every part of the territorial sea.39 It must be exercised 
continuously and expeditiously for the purpose of traversing the territorial sea or visiting a 
harbour or port facility of the coastal State. Innocent passage may not be prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.40 This means, for example, that vessels 
may not launch or recover aircraft or military devices, or compromise the coastal State’s 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanity laws.41 Aircraft in flight do not enjoy the right of 
innocent passage. The coastal State may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified 
parts of the territorial sea on a non-discriminatory basis, but only for reasons essential to its 
national security.42 
There is dispute as to whether warships enjoy the right of innocent passage. It seems 
clear as a matter of treaty construction that they do. First, UNCLOS, Section 3, Subsection 
A (which contains the rules on innocent passage) is entitled “Rules Applicable to all Ships,” 
which does not appear to countenance any exceptions. Second, Article 19(2) specifically 
lists certain acts which, if carried out in the territorial sea, render passage not innocent. 
These include the threat or use of force against the coastal State, the launching or recovery 
of aircraft and the launching or recovery of any military device.43 There would be little need 
specifically to prohibit these acts if warships did not enjoy innocent passage in the first 
place. Nonetheless, some States continue to assert that warships do not enjoy the right of 
innocent passage and demand prior notification or permission before foreign warships 
enter their territorial sea.44 
During an armed conflict, belligerent warships and auxiliaries do not enjoy innocent 
passage in neutral territorial seas. Article 19(1) of UNCLOS expressly subjects the right of 
innocent passage to “other rules of international law,” including the law of maritime 
                                                                                                                                               
that are parties to UNCLOS may exercise the right of transit passage in the Strait of Hormuz, but only 
because it has granted them permission. The International Court of Justice decision in the Corfu Channel case 
is also authority for the position that straits innocent passage is a customary law right. Corfu Channel (UK v. 
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). See also ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 
110–13 (3d ed. 1999); YOSHIFURNI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 107 (2012). 
39. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 17–19. 
40. Id., arts. 18, 19(1). 
41. Id., art. 19(2)(e)–(g). 
42. Id., art. 25(3). 
43. Id., art. 19(2)(a), (e)-(f). 
44. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.2.4, asserts that warships “enjoy the right of innocent passage on an 
unimpeded and unannounced basis.” On the other hand, the CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 78, 87–88, 
acknowledges the debate, but states that “Foreign military vessels may not enter Chinese territorial waters 
without the permission of the Chinese Government.” 
 14 
 
 
neutrality. Under traditional maritime neutrality law, belligerents enjoy only the right of 
“mere” passage in neutral territorial seas.45 This is the position of the San Remo Manual, 
the Helsinki Principles and all of the modern military manuals surveyed.46 The scope and 
nature of mere passage, and how, if it all, it differs from innocent passage, is examined 
below. 
Transit passage is a right of maritime passage and aerial overflight.47 Like innocent 
passage, it must be exercised continuously and expeditiously. The right applies only in 
straits which are (1) used for international navigation and (2) linking two parts of the high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone.48 The second criterion is simply a matter of geography, 
but the first is less clear in its effect. It may amount to a threshold requirement that a 
particular strait is used regularly by vessels for international navigation before the right may 
be granted, although this approach under pre-existing customary law was rejected by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel case.49 Where the right of transit 
passage applies, it is a much broader right than innocent passage. Vessels may exercise it in 
their normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit.50 Many States maintain that 
“normal” means, for example, that warships may launch and recover aircraft during transit 
passage.51 Transit passage may not be suspended or impeded by the coastal State.52 
In straits which do not meet the two-limbed definition for transit passage, UNCLOS 
provides that there is a right of innocent passage which may not be suspended.53 This is 
“straits innocent passage.” Some straits are specifically excluded from the transit passage 
regime and thus subject to straits innocent passage. One example is straits formed by an 
                                                                                                                                               
45. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 10. 
46. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 19, ¶ 19.3; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.3, cmt. at 
503; UK MANUAL supra note 22, ¶ 13.9B; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.5. The GERMAN COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245, supports this view, although later on it states that “mere” passage is to be 
exercised in accordance with the UNCLOS rules on “innocent” passage. Id., ¶ 246. The CHINESE MANUAL 
supra note 25, at 262–63, is not explicit on the point, but its adoption of a traditional position in respect of 
belligerent use of neutral ports suggests a traditional view of passage rights. Many pre-UNCLOS sources use 
the words “mere” and “innocent” interchangeably when referring to the passage right. See, e.g., ROBERT W. 
TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA, 235 (1955) (Vol. 50, U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies); C.H.M. Waldock, The Release of the Altmark’s Prisoners, 24 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 232 (1947). 
47. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 37–44. 
48. Id., arts. 38(2), 37. An example is the Strait of Gibraltar. 
49. Corfu Channel, supra note 38, at 28–29. 
50. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 38(2). 
51. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.5.3.1. 
52. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 38(1), 44. 
53. Id., art. 45(2). 
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island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland where there is a route of similar 
convenience seaward of the island.54 Another is straits which link the high seas or EEZ and 
the territorial sea of a third State.55 
Archipelagic States (States composed entirely of islands) enjoy sovereignty over the 
waters within the archipelago, which are known as archipelagic waters.56 However, they 
may provide designated sea lanes through the archipelago for foreign vessels. Where such 
lanes are designated, vessels enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.57 Where it 
applies, archipelagic sea lanes passage is, for present purposes, identical in its terms to the 
right of transit passage. Most importantly, it may not be suspended.58 
For the purposes of this dissertation, transit passage, straits innocent passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage will be collectively referred to as the non-suspendable 
passage rights. Whether and to what extent they remain applicable during an armed conflict 
is assessed below. 
 
A. Belligerent Vessels’ Passage Rights in Neutral Territorial Seas 
 
1. Mere Passage 
 
Hague XIII, Article 10, provides, “The neutrality of a power is not affected by the mere 
passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents.” 
Article 10 permits, rather than obliges, neutral States to allow belligerents mere passage. It 
is subject to qualification in Article 9, which provides: “A neutral power must apply 
impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions or prohibitions made by it in 
regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent war-
ships and their prizes.” 
Naturally enough, Hague XIII focused on the passage rights of belligerent warships.59 
                                                                                                                                               
54. Id., arts. 38(1), 45(1)(a). An example is the Corfu Channel. 
55. Id., art. 45(1)(b). An example is the Gulf of Aqaba. 
56. Id., art. 49(1). 
57. Id., art. 53(1)–(2). Where lanes are not designated, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be 
exercised through routes normally used for international navigation. Id., art. 53(12). 
58. See, e.g., id., arts. 53(3), 54. 
59. No rule of law purports to limit—or allow neutral States to limit—the passage rights of belligerent-
flagged merchant vessels. None of the contemporary military manuals surveyed asserts such a rule. The 
author is aware of no examples of neutral States purporting to control or limit the passage of belligerent 
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A warship, according to UNCLOS, is a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State 
bearing the external markings distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose 
name appears in the appropriate service list . . . and manned by a crew which is under 
regular armed forces discipline.60  
The San Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles expand the application of the Hague 
XIII passage rules to auxiliaries. An auxiliary is defined in the San Remo Manual as “a 
vessel, other than a warship, that is owned by or under the exclusive control of the armed 
forces of a State and used for the time being on government non-commercial service.”61 
The UK Manual uses identical terms.62 The U.S. manual’s use of the term “belligerent 
forces” includes auxiliaries.63 The German and Chinese manuals adopt the same view.64 
The position that the Hague XIII passage rules apply to auxiliaries is not, in fact, a new one 
and was considered uncontroversial as far back as 1947.65 The extension of the Hague XIII 
regime to include auxiliaries reflects States’ views and is, it may be concluded, customary 
law. 
Hague XIII permits a neutral State to restrict the entry of belligerent warships and 
auxiliaries into its territorial sea, if it does so even-handedly. For example, at the outbreak 
of the Second World War, Norway’s neutrality regulations provided for a defended area 
around Bergen which belligerent warships were forbidden to enter.66 The lack of protest at 
this enactment might suggest it was considered lawful for a neutral State entirely to prohibit 
                                                                                                                                               
merchant vessels. Accordingly, belligerent-flagged merchant vessels continue to enjoy territorial sea passage 
rights in accordance with UNCLOS or equivalent customary law. 
60. UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 29. On the face of it, the definition excludes unmanned underwater or 
surface vehicles as they may not satisfy the “command” or “crew” requirements. Both NWP 1-14M and the 
German Commander’s Handbook consider that unmanned vessels enjoy sovereign immunity; this seems 
uncontroversial. Only NWP 1-14M explicitly states that unmanned vessels enjoy navigational passage rights 
to the same extent as manned vessels. This is more controversial, is not reflected in the other manuals 
surveyed and remains unsettled as a matter of international law. See NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 2.3.4–
2.3.6, 2.5.2.5; cf. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 83. 
61. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 13(h). 
62. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.5.d. 
63. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.6. 
64. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 262. 
65. Waldock, supra note 46, at 216, 218. 
66. Id. at 219. The relevant Norwegian Royal Decree is available at 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 154 (1938). 
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belligerent passage in its territorial sea.67 However, the UK had objected in strong terms to 
an earlier suggestion by Scandinavian countries that they might do this.68 Similarly, in the 
First World War, Germany had objected to a Dutch regulation which entirely forbade 
belligerent entry into its territorial sea unless in circumstances of distress.69 However, the 
modern German Commander’s Handbook, the UK Manual and the San Remo Manual all 
assert that a neutral power can forbid passage to belligerent warships altogether.70 The 
balance of views appears to be that the law permits neutral States completely to prohibit 
passage, especially as States (such as the UK and Germany) which had once objected to 
this position now explicitly accept it. 
Where granted, the right of mere passage is for navigational purposes only and cannot 
permit extravagantly circuitous voyages intended to allow a vessel to evade capture by 
enemy belligerent forces.71 Contrarily, it is also true that “passage through neutral territorial 
waters, although undertaken to avoid an enemy, does not diminish the privilege of using 
the territorial waters for transit.”72 Reconciling these positions requires analysis of two 
other important limitations on belligerent use of neutral territorial sea—the rules 
forbidding belligerents from basing operations or seeking sanctuary in neutral territorial 
sea. Hague XIII, Article 5, provides: “Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and 
waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect 
wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the 
belligerent forces on land or sea.” The prohibition is broader than the text might imply. 
Basing operations includes storing prizes or possibly even holding enemy prisoners as the 
Altmark incident, examined presently, demonstrates. The prohibition against seeking 
sanctuary in neutral territorial seas is a customary law rule not reflected in Hague XIII. It 
                                                                                                                                               
67. See, e.g., TUCKER, supra note 46, at 232–33 n.80; Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra 
note 30, cmt. at 422–24. Such a provision was specifically excluded from Hague XIII, however. HAGUE 
PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 629. 
68. Waldock, supra note 46, at 230. This represented a policy shift. The UK had been a leading 
proponent that Hague XIII should expressly allow neutral States to exclude belligerent warships from their 
territorial sea. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 705–15. 
69. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 232–33 n.80. 
70. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 245; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9B; 
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 19. 
71. Waldock, supra note 46, at 232. 
72. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 235. See also Edwin Borchard, Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the 
Altmark?, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289, 294 (1940). 
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prohibits belligerent warships from sheltering in neutral territorial seas to prevent attack or 
capture by the enemy.73 
The 1940 Altmark incident partially illustrates these rules. Altmark was a German 
auxiliary en route back to Germany from the South Atlantic carrying three hundred 
captured British merchant seamen. As the English Channel was barred by mines, she was 
obliged to transit to the north of the UK. On February 14, 1940, she entered Norwegian 
territorial waters off Trondheim, seemingly to evade capture by the UK Royal Navy. She 
remained in Norwegian waters for two days, travelling some four hundred miles, including 
passage through the Bergen defensive area, in breach of Norway’s domestic neutrality 
regulations. She was intercepted in the Norwegian territorial sea near the Joesing Fjord by a 
Royal Navy squadron which forcibly released her prisoners.74 Norway and Germany 
objected that the UK had breached Norwegian neutrality, but the British claimed they were 
merely enforcing Norwegian neutrality in the face of Norwegian reluctance or inability to 
do so. The British did not contest Altmark’s entry into the Norwegian territorial sea. The 
gravamen of the British objection to her behaviour was her use of the neutral territorial sea 
to shelter, not entry per se.75 
Accordingly, maritime neutrality law places no limits on belligerent warships’ or 
auxiliaries’ entry into neutral territorial sea, but it does regulate subsequent use. This seems 
an artificial division, but it is the only way of reconciling the States’ positions in respect of 
the Altmark. It follows that circuitous voyages with no discernible navigational purpose 
undertaken in territorial seas will be in excess of mere passage and a breach of the law. 
Such voyages would violate the prohibition on seeking sanctuary. On the other hand, use 
of the territorial sea in a manner which is compliant with a passage right lawfully 
exercisable by a belligerent will not be a breach of the law, whatever the circumstances of 
entry.76 
                                                                                                                                               
73. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 17; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9A. 
74. Waldock, supra note 46, at 218–19. 
75. Id. at 233. 
76. A more recent example of a belligerent abusing passage rights in neutral territorial seas was the 
conduct of “manoeuvres” by Iranian forces in Saudi Arabian territorial waters during the Iran/Iraq War. This 
was a clear breach of the law apparently designed to deter Saudi Arabia from clandestine support of Iraq. For 
a brief discussion of that incident, see GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR 1980–88: LAW AND POLICY 
268 (2000) (Vol. 74, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). Walker’s analysis assumes the Iranian 
vessels enjoyed the right of innocent passage, but were acting in excess of it. This dissertation takes the view 
that belligerent Iran did not enjoy innocent passage in neutral Saudi territorial waters, but was instead acting 
in excess of a right of mere passage. 
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The foregoing analysis allows for a comparison to be drawn between innocent and 
mere passage. Figure 1 summarizes the salient features of each right: 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Innocent Passage Mere Passage 
Applicable at all times, except to 
belligerent warships and auxiliaries in neutral 
States’ territorial sea 
Applicable only during an armed 
conflict, and only to warships and auxiliaries 
of belligerent States in neutral States’ 
territorial sea 
When applicable, exercisable by all 
vessels 
When applicable, exercisable only by 
belligerent warships and auxiliaries 
May be temporarily suspended in 
specified parts of the territorial sea on a non-
discriminatory basis to vessels from all States 
for reasons of national security 
May be restricted at the discretion of the 
neutral coastal State so long as restrictions 
are applied impartially to belligerent States, 
or it may be prohibited altogether 
May not be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State 
May not amount to basing naval 
operations or seeking sanctuary 
Must be exercised continuously and 
expeditiously 
Must be exercised continuously and 
expeditiously 
 
In many situations, then, the rights of innocent and mere passage are very similar, if 
not identical. Indeed, prior to UNCLOS, many sources referred to the two 
interchangeably.77 The German Commander’s Handbook considers that mere passage 
should be exercised in accordance with the UNCLOS rules on innocent passage.78 The 
main difference between the two is that the coastal State has a higher degree of discretion 
to restrict or prohibit mere passage than it does innocent passage. 
 
2. Non-Suspendable Passage Rights 
 
Hague XIII and UNCLOS both regulate territorial sea passage rights. UNCLOS does not 
interfere with the Hague XIII right of mere passage, but it does provide that transit 
passage, straits innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot be suspended by 
                                                                                                                                               
77. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 235; Waldock, supra note 46, at 232 (quoting the UK’s comments on the 
Norwegian neutrality proclamation in which it used the term “innocent passage” and the Norwegian 
government’s response referring to the right of “mere” passage). 
78. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 246. 
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the neutral coastal State in any circumstances.79 According to the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, where successive treaties govern the same subject matter the earlier 
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the 
later treaty.80 Accordingly, a coastal State’s neutrality is not impaired by a belligerent’s 
exercise of non-suspendable rights, and a neutral coastal State may not impede belligerents 
in their enjoyment of them.81 
While that is undoubtedly the position when both the coastal State and the passaging 
belligerent State are parties to UNCLOS, the position when either State is not a party to 
UNCLOS is more complex. Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, Peru, Turkey, 
Venezuela and the U.S. are parties to Hague XIII, but not UNCLOS.82 Of these, the U.S. 
strongly asserts that the UNCLOS passage regime is reflective of customary law; Iran 
equally strongly asserts that only innocent passage and straits innocent passage are 
reflective of customary law.83 If the U.S. position is correct, all belligerent States, whether 
UNCLOS parties or not, may enjoy the non-suspendable passage rights in the territorial 
sea of a neutral State. This would be the case regardless of whether the coastal State is a 
party to UNCLOS. If the Iranian view is correct, then where either the belligerent or 
coastal State is not a party to UNCLOS, the belligerent State may only enjoy straits 
innocent passage in addition to Hague XIII mere passage. The San Remo Manual and the 
Helsinki Principles can be read to support either view.84 It has already been observed that 
the weight of academic opinion favours the more restrictive view espoused by Iran.85 
 
3. Exercising Passage Rights: Defensive Measures 
 
The manner in which a belligerent warship or auxiliary may exercise its passage rights is 
                                                                                                                                               
79. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 38(1), 44, 45(2), 54. See also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 23 & 
¶¶ 23.1–23.3. 
80. Where the parties to the later treaty are parties also to the earlier treaty. Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
81. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.3, cmt. at 503. 
82. For Hague XIII parties, see Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (follow Hague XIII hyperlink; then follow State party 
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). For UNCLOS parties, see Status of UNCLOS, supra note 36. 
83. See supra p. 12. 
84. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24 & ¶ 24.1; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.3, 
cmt. at 503. 
85. See supra p. 12. 
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controversial. It is clear that it must not commit any act which violates the State’s 
neutrality; hostilities may not be conducted and visit and search is forbidden.86 But the San 
Remo Manual states that: “Belligerents passing through . . . neutral straits or waters . . . are 
permitted to take defensive measures consistent with their security, including launching and 
recovery of aircraft, screen formation steaming, acoustic and electronic surveillance.”87 
Military manuals surveyed also adopt this position.88 NWP 1-14M and the German 
Commander’s Handbook imply that the right to take defensive measures is based in the 
law of self-defence rather than the vessel’s status as a belligerent. It is not clear whether the 
San Remo Manual provision contemplates that the right to take defensive measures stems 
from a State’s rights as a belligerent or from a State’s inherent right of self-defence. The 
self-defence basis is the correct one. The law is clear that belligerent measures (the conduct 
of hostilities) may not be undertaken in neutral territorial seas. However, the inherent right 
of self-defence applies at all times, even during an armed conflict and even when in another 
State’s territory or territorial seas.89 It is under the law of self-defence that the permissible 
extent of defensive measures by belligerents in neutral territorial seas must be considered. 
Self-defence allows a State to respond forcibly to an armed attack perpetrated against it.90 
An attack on a warship or other State vessel would prima facie amount to an armed attack, 
and permit a forcible response. If a State decides to respond to an armed attack with force, 
the response must satisfy three criteria: immediacy, proportionality and necessity.91 
The ICJ considered allowable defensive measures during passage in the Corfu Channel 
case between the UK and Albania in 1949.92 British warships were exercising straits 
innocent passage in the Corfu Channel in Albanian territorial waters when two of them 
struck mines. It does not matter that the Corfu Channel case concerned facts which occurred 
                                                                                                                                               
86. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 2. 
87. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 30. 
88. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.18; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.6; GERMAN COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 247. The Chinese Manual is silent on the matter. 
89. It has recently been argued that individual units enjoy a right of self-defence under international law 
which is separate from States’ rights of self-defence under U.N. Charter, Article 51. See Charles P. Trumbull 
IV, The Basis of Unit Self-Defense and Implications for the Use of Force, 23 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (2012). For the traditional view that an individual unit’s right of self-defence is 
derived from a State’s Article 51 right, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 243 
(5th ed. 2011) (“it must be grasped that, from the standpoint of international law, all self-defence is national 
self-defence”). 
90. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
91. See generally Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 
92. Corfu Channel, supra note 38. 
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outside of an armed conflict, because the legal regime which governs the right to take 
defensive measures is the law of self-defence, not the law of armed conflict. The Albanian 
government had alleged that the passage of the UK warships was not innocent because the 
ships were manoeuvring and sailing in formation with soldiers on board, were at action 
stations, and the number of ships and their armament was intended by the British to 
intimidate Albania. 
The Court found against Albania on each of these arguments. It found that the ships’ 
sailing formation and being at action stations were proportionate defensive measures 
adopted in response to the known mine threat and the fact that previous British ships had 
been fired upon when sailing through the channel. The ships were carrying their usual 
detachments of marines, which did not affect the nature of the passage.93 The Court 
concluded, however, that a subsequent passage of the strait by a British minesweeping 
force—done without the consent of the Albanian government and with the sole aim of 
sweeping mines—was a breach of Albanian sovereignty.94 In its argument, the British 
government conceded that the minesweeping force was not exercising the right of innocent 
passage, choosing instead to justify the passage on other grounds.95 
The Corfu Channel case shows that proportionate defensive measures are permitted, and 
supports the view that their legality falls to be judged under the self-defence rubric. The 
case is also indicative of the measures which will be considered proportionate in the factual 
circumstances faced by the British squadron. Nonetheless, the San Remo Manual provision 
was drafted in broad terms because the drafters struggled to agree on measures which 
would be lawful in three postulated scenarios.96 In the discussion that follows of those 
scenarios, it will be assumed the belligerent forces within neutral waters are legitimately 
present; they will be referred to as “transiting forces.” 
 
                                                                                                                                               
93. Id. at 30–32. 
94. Id. at 34–35.  
95. The grounds argued were the exercise of a treaty right, to gather evidence for an international 
tribunal, and for the purpose of self-help/self-preservation; all were rejected by the Court in swift terms. Id. 
The present author considers that the self-help grounds was potentially justified and certainly warranted 
closer examination by the Court. See also John Norton Moore, Jus ad Bellum Before the International Court of 
Justice, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 903, 917–18 (2012).  
96. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶¶ 30.1–30.3. 
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a. Defence by transiting forces of allied units outside neutral waters (including by organic aircraft).  
 
The San Remo Manual addresses the question of whether transiting forces in neutral 
territorial waters would be entitled to use force against enemy belligerent forces conducting 
attacks against other units from the transiting forces’ State or allies.97 It has already been 
observed that under the law of self-defence, States may take forcible measures which are 
proportionate, necessary and justified by the immediacy of an ongoing attack against their 
units and personnel. This general principle is unassailable. If these facts were to occur 
outside of an armed conflict, none would claim that the transiting forces’ presence in a 
third State’s territorial seas prevented them from taking lawful self-defence measures 
against the attacking forces. Such measures could include the launching of aircraft, use of 
sensors and firing of ordnance. In the author's view, this general principle is not displaced 
during an armed conflict. Accordingly, the transiting forces are entitled to take action in 
self-defence on behalf of other units while engaged in passage of neutral territorial seas. 
 
b. Measures by transiting forces in response to long-range missile attack against them by over the 
horizon enemy forces.  
 
The distance or over the horizon aspect of this scenario might be considered a red herring, 
but it does affect the range of responses which might be available to the attacked transiting 
forces. Doubtless, launching chaff and decoys or defensive manoeuvring would be 
permitted to defend the transiting forces from the missile attack. Similarly, use of a close-in 
weapon system to shoot down the inbound missile would be lawful. The more difficult 
question is whether, if those measures were sufficient to neutralize the missile attack, the 
transiting forces would be entitled to use force against the units which launched the 
missiles. If the missile attack had been successfully neutralized, then the law of self-defence 
would not permit a retaliatory attack. However, the transiting forces might be concerned 
that the attack upon them (itself a breach of the law while they are in neutral territorial sea) 
was evidence of a likely further attack. If the transiting forces’ sensors were sufficiently 
capable, they might be able to glean further evidence as to whether the unit which attacked 
them was likely to continue the attack. The unit’s posture, course and speed might all assist 
                                                                                                                                               
97. Id., ¶ 30.2. 
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in making that determination. Launching an aircraft or a military device with the intention 
of gaining that evidence would be a lawful defensive measure in this author’s view. If the 
evidence pointed to the conclusion that the attack had ceased (the attacking unit has fled 
the scene, for example) then it would no longer be necessary for the transiting force 
commander to use force, so it would be unlawful for him to do so under self-defence. 
Indeed, unless there was positive evidence that further attack on his units was imminent, 
there would be no grounds for the commander to use force until he was outside of neutral 
territorial waters and once again able to conduct hostilities. 
 
c. Measures by transiting forces in response to a submarine lying in wait outside neutral waters.  
 
This is the hardest of the three scenarios to assess. If the enemy submarine is acting in 
accordance with the law, then it is not a threat to the transiting forces until they exit neutral 
territorial seas. However, at the time of exit, it constitutes an immediate threat and there 
might be insufficient time for the transiting force commander to neutralize it before that 
threat manifests itself. Furthermore, the transiting force commander will obviously not 
know whether the submarine commander plans to abide by the law or not. The law of self-
defence does not require a State to absorb a first blow, which could be potentially fatal, 
before it may use force in self-defence.98 Where the threat of an armed attack is imminent 
and overwhelming, then the potential victim is entitled to take proportionate and necessary 
measures before the attack occurs. That logic would permit the transiting forces to use 
force against the submarine only if it constitutes a sufficiently imminent threat. The 
behaviour of the submarine would be key in making this determination. For example, if 
sonar data indicated the submarine had flooded its torpedo tubes, this would indicate that 
an attack was imminent. 
Lesser measures open to the commander include tactical manoeuvring (such as steering 
an erratic zig-zag course to make it harder for the submarine to obtain a firing solution). 
This would plainly be lawful. Other non-forcible measures open to the transiting force 
commander bring their own difficulties. If the forces remained in neutral territorial waters 
in the hope that the submarine left, they would be at risk of being in excess of mere 
                                                                                                                                               
98. Whether this is described a right of “pre-emptive” self-defence depends on the stage at which the 
armed attack is defined as having started. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 89, at 201–7. 
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passage and breaching the sanctuary rule. If they turn back, then they have forfeited the 
freedom of navigation intentionally preserved in the rules on belligerent passage. 
Depending on the geography of the particular conflict, this could have the perverse effect 
that a submarine lurking at the edge of territorial seas could become virtually immune from 
attack under the law, yet while achieving a significant sea denial effect upon the enemy. 
 
B. Neutral Vessels’ Passage Rights in Belligerent Territorial Seas 
 
The law which applies between belligerents and neutrals is prima facie the law of peace.99 
Subject to the belligerent coastal State’s right temporarily to suspend innocent passage for 
reasons essential to national security, neutrals appear to enjoy the full suite of peacetime 
passage rights in belligerent territorial seas. The San Remo Manual adopts this position, but 
suggests that neutrals inform a belligerent of the passage prior to exercising any of these 
rights although it is clear that this is hortatory only and not an obligation.100 However, there 
is some State practice to the contrary. Many international straits in belligerent territorial 
seas were mined during the Second World War and closed to merchant shipping. Some 
national manuals seem to accept that belligerents retain a right to restrict, even if not 
suspend altogether, passage through straits during an armed conflict. This runs counter to 
the plain text of UNCLOS, but does garner some support from scholars.101  
  
                                                                                                                                               
99. See, e.g., Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 1.3., cmt. at 499. 
100. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 26, ¶ 26.2. 
101. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 377; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The 
Law of Naval Warfare and International Straits, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENIUM 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies). 
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PART TWO: BELLIGERENTS’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN NEUTRAL 
PORTS 
 
Delegates disagreed on the acceptable scope of belligerent activity in neutral ports at the 
Hague Conference.102 Britain, with its many and widespread colonial possessions, did not 
need to rely upon neutral ports for logistical support. It was much readier to condemn their 
use as basing operations than, say, France, which regarded such support merely as the 
provision of “offices of humanity” by the neutral State. Consequently, the rules in Hague 
XIII are the result of compromise. 
Some rules are relatively uncontroversial. For example, a belligerent is under a specific 
duty not to establish a prize court in neutral territory or territorial waters.103 Belligerents 
may not replenish war material or armament, or complete their crews in neutral ports or 
territorial seas.104 These rules will not be examined further.105 Four aspects of belligerent 
use of neutral ports warrant closer analysis, however: refuelling, taking on provisions and 
fresh water (or “revictualing”), the conduct of repairs and the twenty-four hour rule. Each 
will be examined in turn. 
  
A. Refuelling 
 
Hague XIII, Article 19, provides:  
 
                                                                                                                                               
102. JAMES B. SCOTT, THE REPORTS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 861–
62 (1909) [hereinafter HAGUE REPORTS]. 
103. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 4. Interestingly, this rule is not reflected in the manuals surveyed, 
except the CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 261. In the writer’s opinion, there is no reason to doubt this 
remains a rule of international law. Marsden dates the rule as far back as 1694. R. G. Marsden, Early Prize 
Jurisdiction and Prize Law: Part III, 26 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 34, 46 (1911) [hereinafter Marsden, 
Early Prize Law: Part III]. 
104. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 18; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2; NWP 1-14M, supra 
note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 239; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 
25, at 261. The rule is reflected only obliquely in the SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 20(c). The drafters 
considered that Rule 20(c) was sufficient to give effect to Article 18. Id., ¶ 20.2(c). The UK MANUAL, supra 
note 22, ¶ 13.9C.b, adopts the San Remo Manual position. 
105. Another belligerent duty, the duty to abstain from any act which would constitute a violation of the 
coastal State’s neutrality, has already been discussed in the context of passage rights. See supra pp. 20-25. See 
also Hague XIII, supra note 7, arts. 1-2; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 15, 16; Helsinki Principles, supra 
note 10, princ. 1.4; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.8–9; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.3.4; 
GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 243. 
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[Belligerent war-ships] may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port in 
their own country. They may, on the other hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when 
in neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel to be 
supplied.  
 
Further refuelling may not take place in a port in the same neutral State within three 
months.106 The San Remo Manual proposes, contrary to Article 19, that topping up should 
be eschewed for the “more objective and determinable standard” of “being able to reach a 
port of its own territory.”107 The Helsinki Principles do not address the issue specifically, 
but say generally that the “right of passage and sojourn of belligerent warships in neutral 
waters and ports is governed by [Hague XIII], which reflect[s] customary law.”108 The UK 
Manual adopts the San Remo position.109 NWP 1-14M, the German Commander’s 
Handbook and the Chinese Manual all prefer to leave the matter entirely to the discretion 
of the neutral State.110 
While unsatisfactory from the perspective of legal certainty, two arguments suggest 
that, in practice, the lack of clarity makes little difference. First, even were a belligerent 
warship to take sufficient fuel to reach a home port, she would be under no obligation 
actually to go home rather than re-join the hostilities. Such a provision was deliberately 
excluded from Hague XIII.111 Second, the distance of many warships’ theatres of 
operations from home may well mean that the standards are, in reality, the same. 
Accordingly, contrary to the San Remo and UK positions, the better rule is to allow 
topping up. It is a clearer and more objective standard than obliging the neutral State to 
assess how much fuel a belligerent warship would use to get to a home port, especially 
when this volume will vary depending on speed, weather, climate or class of ship. The rule 
limiting repeated refuelling in the same neutral State is the more onerous to belligerents, is 
clear in its effect and is a better safeguard against excessive belligerent use of neutral port 
facilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
106. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 20. 
107. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 20.2(c). 
108. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2, cmt. at 502. 
109. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C. 
110. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 240; 
CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 263. 
111. Despite being pressed for by the British delegate. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 
639. 
 28 
 
 
B. Revictualing 
 
Hague XIII, Article 19, provides “Belligerent war-ships may only re-victual in neutral ports 
or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.” Neutral States have no 
discretion to adopt a uniform topping up policy in respect of victuals as they do with fuel. 
Neither does the three-month resupply limit apply to victuals. Indeed, victuals are 
measured completely differently than fuel. The maximum resupply allowed is the peace 
standard. The practice of setting a ship’s victualing capacity by peace and war standards 
now seems anachronistic. In the UK Royal Navy victualing endurance is set according to 
the ship’s expected tasking (or readiness state) rather than by peace or war.112 As well as 
being anachronistic, these standards are rather opaque. They are defined by the warship’s 
flag State and, for understandable reasons, are often classified information. The peace 
standard is, therefore, often indeterminable by the neutral port authorities and is an 
inappropriate basis for the law. As navies move away from setting victualing capacity by 
peace or war standards, the peace standard limit in Hague XIII is likely to fall into 
desuetude,113 if it has not already. 
The unsuitableness of the peace standard means that there is significant divergence 
among contemporary references as to what limit does apply to revictualing. The Helsinki 
Principles maintain Article 19 still reflects the law, whereas the San Remo Manual provides 
that the same “enough to get you home” standard that applies to fuel should apply to 
victuals. The UK Manual reflects the San Remo position, while the other manuals surveyed 
prefer to leave the matter to neutral States’ discretion.114 The difference between the 
various approaches matters more in the context of victuals than fuel. Topped up, many 
warships of frigate and destroyer size will have the capacity to carry beyond sixty or seventy 
days’ worth of food, while their fuel carrying capacity is much more limited. Topping up 
victuals amounts to a far greater increase in a warship’s sustainability on operations than 
topping up fuel, but it is difficult to recommend a clearer, more objective limit. The 
“peace” and “enough to get you home” approaches are opaque and unsatisfactory. 
                                                                                                                                               
112. 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEFENCE CATERING MANUAL arts. 1301–8 (5th ed. 2011). 
113. For the concept of desuetude, see, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How International Law Dies, 93 
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 939 (2005). 
114. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 20.2(b). UK 
MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C.b; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 240; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 263. 
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Accordingly, this writer recommends that victuals be subject to the same rules as fuel, that 
is topping up is permitted, but resupply from the ports of the same neutral State is 
forbidden within three months. 
 
C. Repairs 
 
Hague XIII, Article 17, provides:  
 
In neutral ports and roadsteads war-ships may only carry out such repairs as are absolutely 
necessary to render them seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatsoever to their 
fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power shall decide what repairs are 
necessary, and these must be carried out with the least possible delay. 
 
Under the strict wording of the Convention, it does not matter whether the damage in 
need of repair occurred by stress of weather or by enemy action.115 So long as the repairs 
are limited to what is absolutely necessary for seaworthiness, repair seems to be permitted. 
By the 1930s, however, international and domestic law began to demonstrate a 
consensus against permitting battle damage repair. For instance, Article 9 of the 1928 
Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality116 forbade battle damage repair altogether. The 
Havana Convention’s applicability was limited by the fact that it was only ratified by the 
United States and seven other States, all of which are located in the Americas.117 The 1938 
neutrality codes of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden) and the U.S. president’s proclamation of neutrality on September 5, 1939 also 
prohibited battle damage repair.118 The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention, an academic 
project undertaken by a group of scholars at Harvard University, similarly forbade it.119 
                                                                                                                                               
115. The contemporaneous record does not report any discussion of this issue among delegates. HAGUE 
REPORTS, supra note 102, at 858. 
116. Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 135 L.N.T.S. 187. 
117. Treaties and States Parties to such Treaties, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ 
ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=290 (last visited Jan. 8, 
2014) [hereinafter Treaty Parties]. 
118. These codes and proclamations are reproduced in PAYSON S. WILD JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SITUATIONS 44–46 (1939). The U.S. had also refused to allow battle damage repairs to Russian ships during 
the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5. See Charles C. Hyde, The Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers in Naval War, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 507, 520 (1908). 
119. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 34. The Convention’s commentary 
surveys State practice from the First World War and nineteenth century conflicts, which is inconclusive. The 
commentary does not explicitly state why the drafters adopted the position they did. Id. at 462–72. 
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During the Second World War, this emerging consensus against battle damage repair was 
undermined by the Admiral Graf Spee incident, which will be examined presently. The law 
on whether battle damage repair is permitted or not remains in dispute.120 The San Remo 
Manual's Rule 20(c) reflects Hague XIII’s silence on the point. The UK Manual adopts the 
text of Rule 20(c) verbatim.121 NWP 1-14M simply records that the law is unsettled.122 The 
German and Chinese manuals are silent on the issue. 
 An unseaworthy belligerent warship is not required to leave a neutral port. Rather, 
as provided by Hague XIII, Article 24, the neutral power is obliged to “take such measures 
as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of taking the sea during the war.” 
Where a ship is interred pursuant to Article 24, so too must be its crew for the remainder 
of hostilities. The Harvard Draft Convention similarly provided that “a condition of 
distress which is the result of enemy action may not be remedied and if the vessel is unable 
to leave, it shall be interned.”123  
The Graf Spee incident partially illustrates these rules.124 In December 1939, following 
an engagement with a Royal Navy squadron, the German battleship Graf Spee put into the 
neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo. The British insisted that the ship be made to leave 
as soon as possible.125 They relied upon Hague XIII, Articles 12, 14 (which provides that 
extended stay in neutral ports may only be granted on account of damage or stress of 
weather) and 24. Great Britain did not expressly rely on Article 17, probably because its 
position on battle damage repair was not clear. The commanding officer of the Graf Spee, 
Captain Langsdorff, requested to stay for a period of fourteen days in order to effect 
repairs. 
While Uruguay was a party to the 1928 Havana Convention, Britain and Germany were 
not, so its express prohibition on battle damage repair was inapplicable.126 Uruguay 
                                                                                                                                               
120. SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 26, ¶ 20.2(c). 
121. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.9C. 
122. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.2. 
123. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 34.  
124. The following facts are taken from TUCKER, supra note 46, at 245 n.2, and Michael W. Lewis, Drones 
and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 294, 305 (2011). 
125. The British position was initially that the Graf Spee should be required to leave “immediately,” but 
this position was relaxed for operational reasons to allow the cruiser Cumberland to arrive at the scene before 
the Graf Spee sailed. Lewis, supra note 124, at 305 n.71. 
126. See Treaty Parties, supra note 117. Uruguay was also not represented at the Consultative Meeting of 
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics that prepared the 1939 Pan-American Declaration of Neutrality. 
In any event, that declaration was silent on the question of battle damage repair. See Consultative Meeting of 
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determined that, under Hague XIII, it was only obliged to prevent repairs that increased 
the vessel’s fighting capability and did not consider itself bound to prevent seaworthiness 
repairs which were the result of enemy action. Uruguay exercised its Hague XIII, Article 
17, right to assess the extent of the repairs necessary. The inspectors concluded that 
seventy-two hours would be sufficient and that Graf Spee would be obliged to depart on 
December 17. After that time, if the ship was still present in Montevideo, it would be 
interred. Interestingly, no party seems to have taken issue with the accuracy or fairness of 
the inspectors’ decision, implying that they regarded Uruguayan port authorities as the 
proper arbiter of what repairs were absolutely necessary within the meaning of Article 17. 
However, the German authorities were unpersuaded that seventy-two hours was sufficient. 
Langsdorff was ordered by the German government to avoid internment at all costs and 
that he should attempt to break out or scuttle the ship. He waited until the end of his 
allotted seventy-two hours and then scuttled the ship in the River Plate on December 17. 
The crew was interred for the remainder of the war. Langsdorff later committed suicide. 
The case of the Graf Spee illustrates the consequences of abusing neutral ports’ 
hospitality, but brings little clarity to the battle damage repair rule. The interwar consensus, 
if it can be called that, against allowing battle damage repairs was accepted in neither word 
nor practice by the protagonists in the Graf Spee affair (none argued in favour of the 
prohibition).  
What might be the jurisprudential basis for forbidding battle damage repairs? If, instead 
of managing to limp into port, the warship had sunk and the neutral State had rescued the 
crew, the neutral State would have been obliged to inter them until the end of the conflict 
or otherwise ensure they could take no further part in hostilities.127 A ship rendered 
unseaworthy, even if not sunk, by enemy action should be considered lost. It is not the role 
of a neutral State to assist a belligerent in reversing that fact. As a matter of lex ferenda, these 
considerations probably tip the balance in favour of a prohibition against battle damage 
repair in neutral ports. However, the state of the present law is unclear. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics—Final Act, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SUPPLEMENT 1, 10 (1940). 
127. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 24. See further OPPENHEIM VOL. II, supra note 5, at 471–73. 
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D. The Twenty-Four Hour Rule 
 
The twenty-four hour rule is found in Hague XIII, Article 12: “In the absence of special 
provision to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent war-ships are not 
permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said Power for 
more than twenty-four hours, except in cases covered by the present Convention.” The 
San Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles reflect the twenty-four hour rule in Article 
12 terms.128  
The UK position, however, is that the rule no longer reflects the law in view of modern 
State practice.129 This bold statement seems surprising. It is in stark contrast to other 
national manuals surveyed, which expressly recognize the rule.130 On further examination, 
though, the British position is not the outright rejection of the rule that it first seems, but a 
geographical qualification. If, for example, the UK was engaged in an armed conflict in the 
Arabian Gulf, a Royal Navy warship engaged in other peacetime operations in the 
Caribbean and making no contribution to operations in the Gulf is not, on the British view, 
prevented from staying in a Caribbean port in excess of twenty-four hours. Such a visit 
would not impact on the campaign in the Gulf and so application of the rule is 
unnecessary.131 It is curious the UK Manual should choose the twenty-four hour rule, but 
no other, in making this geographical argument. If the principle is sound, there is no reason 
why geography should not limit every other rule of maritime neutrality. Despite the claim 
that this interpretation of the rule is based on observance of modern State practice, the lack 
of acceptance of a geographical limit in other prominent national manuals means it cannot 
be considered as reflective of customary law. 
Assuming the twenty-four hour rule remains applicable, under Hague XIII it is only a 
default position. It only applies when the neutral State has declined to legislate a different 
period. Once again, what would otherwise have been an impasse at the Hague Conference 
                                                                                                                                               
128. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 24; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2. 
129. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.4. This position on the twenty-four hour rule was adopted by 
several States in the negotiations at the Second Hague Peace Conference. Ironically, it was opposed by Great 
Britain. HAGUE REPORTS, supra note 102, at 848–54. 
130. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.3.2.1; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 246; 
CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 263. 
131. This argument is taken from Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 103–4 
(2006). 
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in 1907 was resolved by providing a default rule, but ultimately leaving the matter to 
neutral States to determine for themselves as long as they did so impartially between the 
belligerents.132 
Article 12's phrase “except in cases covered by the present Convention” creates 
ambiguity. Where the Convention makes express derogation from the twenty-four hour 
rule, there is no difficulty. For example, where a neutral port is unable to furnish a 
belligerent warship with fuel133 within twenty-four hours of its arrival, the twenty-four hour 
rule is extended by a further twenty-four hours.134 Also, where opposing belligerent vessels 
are in the same neutral harbour, the neutral State may impose a twenty-four hour interval 
between their departures.135 
However, the way in which the twenty-four hour rule interacts with the rules on 
belligerent passage in neutral territorial sea is less clear. The right of mere passage is 
covered by Hague XIII in Articles 9 and 10, but there is no express requirement that 
passage must take less than twenty-four hours. The modern non-suspendable passage 
rights—transit passage, straits innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, 
discussed in Part One—are obviously not covered by Hague XIII.136 In the Second World 
War, the States-party to the Pan-American General Declaration of Neutrality of October 3, 
1939 concluded that all belligerent passage was subject to a twenty-four hour time limit.137 
This was qualified in respect of passage through the Panama Canal, however, because it 
was simply not possible to transit the Canal and Panamanian territorial waters in less than 
twenty-four hours. The annexed Neutrality Proclamation to the Canal Zone therefore 
allowed the time taken to transit the Canal to be added to the twenty-four hour period 
otherwise granted on the grounds of necessity.138 
                                                                                                                                               
132. NEFF, supra note 9, at 133. 
133. The word the Convention uses is “coal,” but it is hopefully not too controversial to construe this as 
“fuel.” 
134. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 19. 
135. Id., art. 16. For historical examples of this rule being enforced, see R. G. Marsden, Early Prize 
Jurisdiction and Prize Law: Part II, 25 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 243 (1911) [hereinafter Marsden, 
Early Prize Law: Part II]; Marsden, Early Prize Law: Part III, supra note 103, at 48.  
136. See supra pp. 19-20. 
137. General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics ¶ 3(d), Oct. 3, 1939, 3 Bevans 604, 
reprinted in 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 9 (1940). 
138. Regulations Concerning Neutrality in the Canal Zone, Proclamation No. 2350, 4 Federal Register 
3821 (Sept. 9, 1939), reprinted in 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 28, 29 
(1940). 
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The Helsinki Principles use a formulation similar to the Canal Zone proclamation in 
describing belligerent passage rights. They assert the applicability of the twenty-four hour 
rule to mere passage, but permit the exercise of the non-suspendable passage rights for 
periods in excess of twenty-four hours “where the time ordinarily needed for this passage is 
more than 24 hours.” The Helsinki Principles rely on the UNCLOS formulation that such 
passage must be continuous and expeditious to limit any belligerent abuse of neutral 
territorial sea.139 On a first reading, the San Remo Manual appears to apply the twenty-four 
hour rule to Hague XIII mere passage, but not to the non-suspendable passage rights. Rule 
21 states: 
 
[A] belligerent warship or auxiliary vessel may not extend the duration of its passage through 
neutral waters . . . for longer than 24 hours unless [this is] unavoidable on account of damage 
or the stress of weather. The foregoing rule does not apply in international straits and waters in 
which the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is exercised.140  
 
Rule 21 says bluntly that the twenty-four hour rule “does not apply” in international straits 
and archipelagic sea lanes, whereas the Helsinki Principles permit an exception to the rule 
only when the normal time taken for such passage is more than 24 hours. However, the 
San Remo Manual’s explanation makes clear that Rule 21 is intended to be construed in the 
same way as the rule is stated in the Helsinki Principles.141 
The justification for the application of the twenty-four hour rule to passage is clear—
belligerent forces are forbidden from using neutral waters (whether archipelagic, in 
international straits or elsewhere) as a safe haven or as a base of operations.142 Where the 
twenty-four hour rule is breached, it may be presumed that either the base of operations or 
sanctuary prohibitions have also been breached. This presumption is rebuttable only when 
a belligerent warship is exercising a non-suspendable passage right and it would normally 
take longer than twenty-four hours to complete the passage. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
139. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 2.2, 2.4, cmt. at 502. 
140. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 21. 
141. Id., ¶¶ 21.1–21.2. 
142. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, cmt. at 502. 
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PART THREE: BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF NEUTRAL TRADE 
 
Belligerents have long sought to deny their enemies resources which sustain their war 
effort. One way of doing this is to strangle the enemy’s ability to import war-sustaining 
resources from overseas, whether from neutral States or from enemy overseas possessions 
or colonies. Since, even now, so much trade is carried by sea, this task has always fallen to 
maritime forces. Hague XIII prevents neutral States from supplying belligerents with war 
material, but expressly preserves the rights of neutral private citizens to continue trading 
with belligerents, even in material which aids the belligerent war effort.143 Nonetheless, they 
do so at their own risk, because belligerents are entitled to seize and confiscate items of 
contraband. Contraband is any item which is (a) useful to the enemy in waging its war and 
(b) actually destined to reach the enemy. 
Historically, belligerents also sought to control their enemies’ trade with their colonies. 
Usually this trade was confined to vessels flagged to the belligerent colonial power. These 
vessels, enemy in character, could be captured as of right. However, in order to place this 
trade beyond the reach of their enemy, belligerents allowed neutrals to carry colonial trade, 
even though this was a trade usually closed to them. Innovative prize courts created the 
Rule of 1756 to justify capturing neutral vessels engaged in belligerent colonial trade. These 
two rules—contraband and the Rule of 1756—are the subject of this Part. 
 
A. Contraband 
 
Contraband controls were last employed extensively during the First and Second World 
Wars. Since then they have been used only sparingly: the Arab-Israel conflict from 1948 to 
1979 and the brief conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.144 Given the lack 
of recent State practice, much of the law is rather old. In fact, it was considered old even 
                                                                                                                                               
143. Hague XIII, supra note 7, arts. 6–7. 
144. There is evidence of Russian controls on Georgian trade at sea during the 2008 conflict, but the 
nature of these controls is unclear. Some news sources claim Russia established a blockade. Russian Navy 
Blockade Georgia, CHINA VIEW (Aug. 10, 2008), http://news .xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
08/10/content_9138604.htm#prof. The 2009 Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia claimed instead that the Russian Black Sea Fleet established a maritime security 
zone. See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA, 
REPORT 212 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf [hereinafter FACT-
FINDING REPORT]. 
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prior to the outbreak of the First World War. As noted by one commentator, “in 1914 [in 
the UK] the law of prize stood . . . virtually where it was left by Lord Stowell at the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars.”145 Nonetheless, rules on contraband are contained in modern 
military manuals and there is nothing which yet indicates that States believe that 
contraband law has fallen into desuetude. 
As far back as the thirteenth century, belligerents intercepted goods destined for their 
enemies and pre-emptively purchased them from the neutral carrier (by the payment of 
freight money).146 Interference with enemy goods in neutral shipping was eventually 
outlawed in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which provided that “The neutral flag covers 
enemy’s goods with the exception of contraband of war.”147 This rule, known as the “free 
ship, free goods” principle, meant that belligerents could not interfere with private neutral 
traders even if they were carrying their enemies’ goods. However, contraband of war was 
preserved as an exception and was subject to capture and condemnation as prize. Neutral 
States were prepared to tolerate this exception partly because the acts of the neutral carriers 
caught carrying contraband were not attributed to their government. Private traders bore 
responsibility and loss themselves. By the early 1900s, this was well known as the 
“commercial adventure” principle.148 
Disagreement at the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference precluded the inclusion of 
any provisions on contraband in Hague XIII.149 The 1909 Declaration of London did 
contain detailed provisions on contraband, but it was never ratified. Commitments to abide 
by it on both sides in the First World War were soon abandoned.150 By 1909, the two 
classifications of goods—arms and ammunition, and dual-use goods—were universally 
                                                                                                                                               
145. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control and the Law of Prize, 22 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 74 (1945). For a fascinating account of the influence of the 
decisions of the English Prize Court in the early 1800s, see EDWARD S. ROSCOE, LORD STOWELL—HIS LIFE 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH PRIZE LAW (1916). 
146. In England this was done by “portsmen” under notional control of a regional port admiral. They 
were most charitably characterized as privateers and were a law unto themselves, but aggrieved parties did 
occasionally complain about their conduct to the Crown and achieved the restoration of their property. The 
first judicial prize condemnation seems to have been in 1426. See R. G. Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize 
Law: Part I, 24 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 675, 681–82 (1909) [hereinafter Marsden, Early Prize Law: 
Part I]. 
147. Declaration of Paris art. 2, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. TS 1, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 
791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907). 
148. NEFF, supra note 9, at 20. 
149. HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 8, at 1111. 
150. See, e.g., British Orders–in-Council dated March 11, 1915 and February 1, 1917. These were the 
subject of litigation in The Leonara [1918] P. 182. 
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accepted as absolute and conditional contraband, respectively. Absolute contraband could 
be seized as long as it was consigned to an address or recipient in territory belonging to or 
controlled by the enemy, no matter whether the specific recipient within that territory was 
a government official or a private person. The circumstances in which conditional 
contraband could be seized were stricter. It could be seized only if it was destined 
specifically for the enemy belligerent’s government or armed forces within enemy 
controlled territory. Such specific destination could be presumed if the articles were 
consigned to a known government contractor, or if the goods were consigned to a 
“fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed 
forces of the enemy.”151 
Because an item’s utility in any given armed conflict would depend on the 
circumstances of that conflict, belligerent States would set out, in published lists, items they 
would consider to be absolute and conditional contraband liable to seizure.152 Goods not 
included in the lists were considered “free” under the Declaration of Paris. Listing, 
therefore, came to be a lawful requirement before items could be seized as contraband, 
although it is not clear when this requirement crystalized into law. It was accepted without 
question at the London Conference in 1909.153 However Sir William Scott’s prize decisions 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries make no reference to the requirement 
of a contraband list.154 
This Part will first consider the three criteria for establishing that an item is contraband: 
prior publication in a list, qualification as an item of absolute or conditional contraband 
and enemy destination. It will then consider the penalties which have been imposed by 
prize courts in contraband cases, before assessing how the law is likely to develop in future. 
 
1. Contraband Lists 
 
The San Remo Manual requires belligerents to publish in advance “reasonably specific” 
lists of goods they consider to be contraband in the circumstances of the particular armed 
                                                                                                                                               
151. Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval War arts. 30, 33, 34, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 338 
[hereinafter Declaration of London]. 
152. An early example was the war between the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands in 1589. 
It is described in Marsden, Early Prize Law: Part I, supra note 146, at 692. 
153. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 22–25. 
154. See, e.g., The Ringende Jacob (1798) 1 C. Rob. 89. 
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conflict.155 The UK Manual and the German Commander’s Handbook reflect the San 
Remo Manual position.156 NWP 1-14M observes the requirement for lists, but opines that 
it may be satisfied by the publication of a list of “free” goods.157 The U.S. approach seems 
to leave more latitude to the belligerent State and provide less certainty for neutral carriers. 
If reasonably specific lists are the law, the free goods approach would likely not be 
sufficient to satisfy that standard.  
In the post-Second World War conflicts in which belligerents have employed 
contraband controls, State practice indicates that it is the more onerous requirement to 
publish affirmative lists of contraband that best reflects the law. For instance, during its 
conflict with Israel which began in 1948, Egypt, having initially denied that contraband lists 
were required at all, subsequently published affirmative lists.158 In the conflict between 
India and Pakistan in 1971, both sides published affirmative contraband lists.159 
Even when drafting affirmative lists, however, States enjoy broad discretion as to 
which items they list as contraband. Indeed, while still neutral, the U.S. protested against 
the UK’s long contraband lists in both world wars.160 It is, therefore, easy to see why NWP 
1-14M places relatively little store by the contraband list as a limit on belligerent 
contraband controls. Against that, it might be argued that at least the requirement of a 
published affirmative list gives neutral States the opportunity to protest against the listed 
items. 
 
2. Absolute and Conditional Contraband 
 
The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband was prescribed in the 1909 
Declaration of London. The Declaration listed certain items which would automatically 
                                                                                                                                               
155. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 149. 
156. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.109; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 260. 
The Chinese Manual is silent on the issue of lists. 
157. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1. 
158. See Thomas D. Brown Jr., World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions 
on Neutral Shipping with Israel, 50 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 849, 857–58 (1966). 
159. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, Belligerent Interference 
with Neutral Commerce, 66 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 386, 386–87 (1972) for both States’ 
lists, which were published in December 1971. Neither side had published a list in the 1965 conflict. 
160. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 264 n.3; Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, 
Resolution on Contraband of War (Oct. 3, 1939), reprinted in 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SUPPLEMENT 13, 14 (1940). 
39 
 
 
qualify as absolute or conditional contraband without the need for notice in lists.161 
However, it allowed belligerents the discretion to add other items by publishing lists.162 
Perusal of the items listed in the Declaration demonstrates the futility of attempting 
specifically to catalogue contraband items in an international agreement. Many items seem 
quaint in the modern context and would surely not be considered contraband today. For 
example, “all kinds of harness” and “horseshoes and shoeing materials” automatically 
qualify as contraband under the Declaration.163 The problem of the list becoming dated was 
recognized as the Declaration was being drafted. Spain proposed, by way of a solution, that 
there should be consensual periodic review of the lists in the Declaration. Given, however, 
that it was troublesome enough to persuade States to agree on the lists in time of peace, it 
was rightly concluded that, were a review to fall during a period of hostilities, agreement 
would prove impossible. The idea was, accordingly, rejected.164 
The line between absolute and conditional contraband was blurred by belligerent 
practice in the world wars. It was contended by both sides in both conflicts that it was 
impossible to distinguish between goods intended for armed forces’ consumption and 
goods intended for civilian consumption.165 The practice of government rationing of goods 
available on the civilian market added to the difficulty. In the Arab-Israeli conflict Egypt 
initially maintained a distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, but later in 
the conflict its prize court abandoned it.166 Moreover, during the conflict between India 
and Pakistan in 1971, the lists drawn up by both parties made no distinction between 
absolute and conditional contraband.167 The San Remo Manual eschews any contemporary 
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband; the Helsinki Principles and UK 
                                                                                                                                               
161. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 22, 24 (absolute and conditional contraband, 
respectively). See also James B. Scott, The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909: Part I, 8 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 274, 305–9 (1914). 
162. Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 23, 25. 
163. Id., arts. 22(6) & 24(12), respectively. Against this view, it must be conceded that in 1971 India’s 
contraband list did include “all kinds of harness of a military character.” Belligerent Interference with Neutral 
Commerce, supra note 159, at 387. 
164. Scott, supra note 161, at 309–10. 
165. See The Alwaki and others [1940] P. 215 at 218 per Sir Boyd Merriman, P (“There was the clearest 
possible evidence of German Decrees which imposed Government control on all these articles and 
prescribed that they were automatically seized at the moment of coming into the customs house.” (relying on 
The Hakan [1918] AC 418)). 
166. See Brown, supra note 158, at 859. 
167. Belligerent Interference with Neutral Commerce, supra note 159, at 386–87. 
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Manual take the same position.168 The German Commander’s Handbook states that the 
distinction is no longer relevant, but observes that in all cases there must be sufficient 
evidence to show that the goods are ultimately destined for the military.169 Only NWP 1-
14M continues to draw the distinction, but even it acknowledges its collapse during the 
Second World War.170 The Chinese Manual is silent on the issue.171 
How should prize courts and admiralty practitioners deal with this merger? First, courts 
must be careful only to condemn items which appear on States’ reasonably specific 
contraband lists. Second, of those items listed, some will be undeniably useful in 
prosecuting the conflict. Examples include weaponry, ammunition and other military 
hardware. Little additional evidence will be required for the court to conclude that such 
items are destined for the military. However, in the case of dual-use items, such as fuel or 
foodstuffs, the prize court should require clear evidence (which at least satisfies a balance 
of probabilities evidentiary burden) that they are destined for military or governmental use 
before they may be condemned. Further, it must be clear that the actual goods seized are 
destined for military use; proof that their import will free up other resources commercially 
available for military use is insufficient. Although sanctioned in the English Prize Court 
during the world wars, such reasoning was never relied on exclusively to justify a 
condemnation in prize. Based on an Order-in-Council dated July 7, 1916, the approach was 
characterized as a reprisal measure. That an import frees up commercially available 
resources has not been employed as a basis for condemnation by a belligerent in any 
subsequent conflict and should not be considered part of the contemporary law. 
While belligerent States enjoy a broad discretion as to which items to include in their 
contraband lists, international law does recognize that certain items, or free goods, should 
never be included as contraband.172 More recently, the San Remo Manual sought to specify 
a minimum standard for free goods, including religious objects, articles intended for the 
treatment of the sick and wounded, civilian bedding, essential foodstuffs and means of 
shelter, items for prisoners of war and other goods not susceptible for use in armed 
                                                                                                                                               
168. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 148; Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.2–5.2.3. UK 
MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶¶ 13.106–13.111. On the UK MANUAL, see also Haines, supra note 131, at 98 n.23. 
169. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 260. 
170. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1. 
171. One contemporary commentator maintains there is still a distinction between absolute and 
conditional contraband, but cites no national manuals or State practice in support of this position. Bothe, 
supra note 18, ¶ 1142. 
172. See, e.g., Declaration of London, supra note 151, arts. 28–29; Scott, supra note 161, at 311–12. 
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conflict.173 These categories are taken from analogous provisions in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions174 and the 1977 Additional Protocol I.175 The UK Manual, NWP 1-14M and 
the German Commander’s Handbook use nearly identical terms.176 
 
3. Destination 
 
Where items are consigned directly to destinations in enemy territory, determining as a 
matter of fact that there is the requisite enemy destination is a relatively straightforward 
endeavour. But neutral traders, whose livelihoods may have been dependent on trade in a 
particular commodity in time of peace with a now belligerent State, might face ruination 
when that commodity was declared contraband. One way to reduce the risk of capture and 
condemnation was to import the commodity via another neutral port. Superficially at least, 
it would appear that the goods were being shipped between two neutral traders in two 
neutral States. The doctrine of “continuous voyage” was developed to allow a prize court 
to look at the cargo’s ultimate—not immediate—destination and condemn it if it was, in 
fact, destined for the enemy.177 
The doctrine was first employed in England in The Jesus (1756).178 It has been repeatedly 
employed subsequently. During the U.S. Civil War, Union prize courts routinely applied it 
in contraband cases. The U.S. Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, would later 
explain to the U.S. Senate, which was complaining bitterly about British contraband rules in 
force during the First World War, “[i]t will be recalled, however, that American Courts 
have established various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of ‘continuous voyage’ 
has been not only asserted by the American tribunals, but extended by them.”179 
                                                                                                                                               
173. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 150, ¶ 150.2. 
174. E.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 55, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
175. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 54, 70, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I]. 
176. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.110; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.1; GERMAN 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 261. The Chinese Manual is silent on this issue. 
177. See, e.g., The Polly (1800) 2 C. Rob. 361, 368–69, per Sir William Scott. 
178. Burrell 165. See also O. H. Mootham, The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, 1756–1815, 8 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, 66 (1927). 
179. Reproduced in The Kim and others (Condemnation of cargo) [1915] P. 215, at 274. Examples of U.S. cases 
are Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. 110 (1855), and The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 514 (1865). 
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The doctrine of continuous voyage was recognized in the Declaration of London, 
although a compromise was struck between those States which observed the doctrine 
(Great Britain and the United States) and those which did not (the continental European 
powers).180 The Declaration applied the doctrine to absolute contraband, but not 
conditional contraband.181 The Declaration’s provision in this respect was soon abandoned 
by Great Britain and Germany in the First World War.182 As the distinction between 
absolute and conditional contraband has likely also been abandoned, the Declaration’s 
position is no longer tenable, if it ever was. During the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Egyptian 
Prize Court relied on the doctrine to find that Genoa was a “principal base for [any] 
contraband traffic destined for Israel.”183 
The San Remo Manual recognizes the doctrine of continuous voyage by the use of the 
phrase “ultimately destined” for enemy territory.184 The UK Manual reflects this position.185 
Continuous voyage is also preserved by NWP 1-14M.186 The German Commander’s 
Handbook holds that continuous voyage may not apply in blockade, but accepts its 
applicability in the context of contraband.187 The Helsinki Principles also apply continuous 
voyage to contraband, albeit subject to an evidentiary rule that, in cases of doubt as to 
whether goods are intended for a military destination, the burden of proof in subsequent 
prize proceedings lies with the captor State.188 As will be seen, this evidentiary rule does not 
reflect domestic prize court decisions. Nonetheless, the broader doctrine of continuous 
voyage undoubtedly reflects contemporary customary law. 
The doctrine of continuous voyage depends upon the capturers being able to show—
or, perhaps, the neutral carrier’s failure to show otherwise—that the goods would proceed 
from the intervening neutral port to enemy territory. Consequently, if it could be shown 
that the journey was broken or ended at the neutral port, the doctrine would not apply. 
                                                                                                                                               
180. Scott, supra note 161, at 316. 
181. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 35. 
182. The Louisiana and Other Ships [1918] AC 461, 470, per Lord Parker of Waddington. 
183. The Flying Trader, 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 440, 442 (Prize Ct. of Alexandria 1956) 
(Egypt). See also George K. Walker, State Practice Following World War Two: 1945–1990, in THE LAW OF NAVAL 
WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING 120, 123 (Richard J. Grunawalt ed., 1993) (Vol. 65, 
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
184. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 148, ¶ 148.4. 
185. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106–9; Haines, supra note 131, at 98, 106–7. 
186. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.1.2. 
187. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 261, 301. 
188. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.3-4, cmt. at 510–11. 
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The existence of a break is a question of fact in each case. In Britain, Sir William Grant 
considered that the goods’ “importation into the common stock of the country” was 
required,189 reasoning later adopted by the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in The 
Bermuda.190 Unloading and reloading was insufficient, as was unloading and reloading into a 
different ship for onward shipment. Sale to another party was sufficient only where it was 
evidence of bona fide importation. Only clear evidence of the landing of the goods and 
payment of import duties was enough to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold.191 
During the First and Second World War, other evidentiary and procedural devices 
employed by prize courts made it easier for capturing States to prove items were headed 
for an enemy destination. For example, the “rationing” doctrine introduced in the English 
Prize Court allowed the court to presume that if a neutral power which neighboured the 
enemy imported goods in excess of its normal peacetime supply, the excess was going to 
the enemy.192 While dicta indicated the English court regarded rationing as grounds in law 
to condemn cargo as prize, there was a marked reluctance to rely on it alone as grounds for 
confiscation.193 Another device was shifting the burden of proof on the destination issue 
completely to the neutral trader. The English Prize Court in the First World War adopted 
this approach, on the ground that: “The State of the captors is necessarily unable to 
investigate the relations between the neutral trader and his correspondents in enemy or 
neutral countries, but the neutral trader is or ought to be in a position to explain doubtful 
points.”194 
First World War prize courts were also prepared to read the phrase “fortified place” 
widely to ensure as many dual-use goods as possible could be defined as conditional 
contraband. Under the Declaration of London, goods identified as conditional contraband 
                                                                                                                                               
189. The William (1806) 5 C. Rob. 385. 
190. The Bermuda, supra note 179. 
191. The Immanuel (1799) 2 C. Rob. 186, 203, per Sir William Scott; The Kronprinsessan Margareta [1921] 1 
AC 486, 494, 499 (Privy Council). See generally Mootham, supra note 178, at 74–79; Scott, supra note 161, at 
314–15. 
192. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 89–95; TUCKER, supra note 46, at 275 n.25; Brown, supra note 158, at 
854. 
193. The Baron Stjernblad [1917] AC 173, 177; The Kim, supra note 179, at 223–24, 232; Fitzmaurice, supra 
note 145, at 89–93.  
194. The Louisiana, supra note 182, at 465. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Supreme Prize 
Court similarly declared that the onus of proving innocence lay with the neutral carrier and that this was the 
“generally accepted practice by Prize Courts of all countries.” The Arabia, July 20, 1904, reported in 1 CECIL J. 
B. HURST & FRANCIS E. BRAY, RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES 42 (1912) [hereinafter “HURST & BRAY 
VOL. I”]. 
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could be confiscated if they were bound for a fortified place belonging to the enemy.195 The 
German government identified all major ports in the British Isles as “fortified places” in 
1915.196 The English Prize Court adopted a similar approach for German ports in the same 
year.197 Another British First World War evidentiary presumption held that enemy 
destination was presumed to exist if goods were consigned to a person in a neutral State 
who had previously forwarded goods to the enemy.198 During the Second World War, the 
English Prize Court also presumed that, in a totalitarian State such as Italy or Germany, the 
government would requisition and dispose of all goods in a manner which would best 
support the war effort.199 
The 1798 case of The Ringende Jacob demonstrates how the evidentiary approach of the 
English court in the twentieth century had changed since the Napoleonic Wars. In respect 
of a cargo of unwrought iron, destined for the French naval base port of Brest, Sir William 
Scott said, “as this cargo is going to a port of naval equipment, it would very probably be 
applied as a naval store; but it may be too much to decide merely on this inference, that it is 
an article absolutely hostile.”200 He sought the opinion of an inspecting officer of the king’s 
yards as to whether the iron should be considered a naval store or not. This apparent 
restraint is in remarkable contrast with the evidentiary presumptions his successors made 
during the First and Second World Wars. 
Taken together, the evidentiary rules employed in the world wars had the effect that 
virtually all goods destined to the enemy, and a great many goods destined for 
neighbouring neutral States, could be confiscated as contraband. To describe contraband as 
an exception to “free ship, free goods” in these circumstances seems absurd—the 
exception had become the rule. Evidentiary rules of prize courts are a domestic law issue, 
and would not expect to be found in national military law of armed conflict manuals. In a 
common law country such as the UK, the cases cited nonetheless remain good law. If, in a 
future conflict, contraband controls were imposed and prize courts employed, it seems 
                                                                                                                                               
195. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 34, and supra p. 37. 
196. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 269 n.10. 
197. The Kim, supra note 179, at 271–72. The British government formally abandoned the distinction 
between destinations required of absolute and conditional contraband in April 1916. TUCKER, supra note 46, 
at 269 n.10. 
198. British Maritime Rights Order-in-Council (July 7, 1916). 
199. The Alwaki and Others, supra note 165; The Monte Contes [1944] AC 6, 13 (Privy Council) per Lord 
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200. The Ringende Jacob, supra note 154. 
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likely that these evidentiary devices could be employed again, to the detriment of neutral 
traders. 
 
4. Penalty for Contraband Carriage 
 
Having identified items as contraband, prize courts have imposed various penalties on 
neutral contraband carriers. These have included confiscation of the contraband items, 
confiscation of the remaining non-contraband cargo and confiscation of the vessel. It 
stands to reason that in all circumstances the contraband items will be confiscated to avoid 
the possibility of their reaching their intended enemy destination. The other penalties are of 
interest, however, because they might prove more costly to the neutral carrier than the 
mere confiscation of the contraband items. An assessment of each of them follows. 
Caution is required, however. Except for modern developments in arms trade 
regulation, considered below, international law does not forbid private citizens carrying 
contraband items.201 Even if neutral States were obliged to prevent their citizens carrying 
contraband, the remedy for a breach of that obligation would lay between the aggrieved 
belligerent and the errant neutral State, not the private neutral carrier. The penalties 
imposed by prize courts on neutral traders found to be carrying contraband must, 
therefore, be viewed as a matter of domestic law. Nonetheless, English Prize Court judges 
have often ruled that they were applying international law. In The Maria (1799), Sir William 
Scott said,  
 
The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, here, in the belligerent country, according to the known 
law and practice of nations: but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who 
sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting 
in Stockholm.202 
  
The present author’s view is that a prize court applies domestic law, but domestic law 
which should accord with the relevant principles of international law. The decisions 
themselves are plainly not automatically declaratory of international law. 
Confiscation of the remaining innocent cargo first occurred in France. France 
introduced a policy of “infection” in 1778, decreeing that where three-quarters of the value 
                                                                                                                                               
201. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 7. 
202. 1 C. Rob. 340, 350. 
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of a vessel’s cargo was contraband, it was entitled to confiscate the rest as well.203 The 
English Prize Court later also confiscated innocent cargo on the basis that contraband had 
infected it. It did so in The Staat Emden (1798),204 but only in respect of innocent items in 
the same ownership as the contraband. In The Kronprinsessan Margareta and other ships,205 the 
UK Privy Council found that the basis of the rule was not punishment. Rather, it was to 
deter shippers from trading in contraband:  
 
[F]ew modes of deterring contraband trade are more effectual than to establish a rule, known 
by and applicable to all, that the inclusion by a shipper among his other shipments by the same 
vessel of one parcel having in fact an ulterior enemy destination may lead to the condemnation 
of the whole.206  
 
On the English approach, the contraband cargo had to account for “a substantial 
proportion of the goods” before the remaining cargo could be confiscated.207 
The Declaration of London did not contain any threshold requirement, although the 
principle of infection was recognized without great dissent among the delegates at the 
London Conference.208 Although Great Britain relied on it during the First World War, it 
was not often employed in the English Prize Court in the Second World War. This is 
because longer, more comprehensive contraband lists had reduced the need for the Crown 
to rely on it in justifying confiscation applications—not because the UK no longer viewed 
infection as reflective of the law.209 
Infection was not relied upon in reported cases from the Egyptian Prize Court in the 
Arab-Israel conflict, nor by India or Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. In these more limited 
conflicts, it might have been that the factual circumstances which could have invoked the 
doctrine of infection simply did not arise. The principle is not explicitly recognized in any 
of the modern military manuals surveyed, but it would not need to be. To the naval 
operator to whom such manuals are addressed, the principal concern is whether he has 
                                                                                                                                               
203. NEFF, supra note 9, at 65. 
204. 1 C. Rob. 26. 
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grounds to capture, not how the cargo will be disposed after subsequent judicial 
proceedings. The relative absence of State practice since the First World War should not 
lead to the conclusion that States have abandoned the infection doctrine. The policy reason 
behind it remains valid and could lead to its invocation again. 
As to confiscation of the vessel, the 1909 Declaration of London provided that where 
at least 50 per cent of a vessel’s cargo was contraband by value, weight, volume or freight, 
then the vessel might also be condemned as good prize.210 The Declaration’s commentary 
observed that the condemnation of the vessel would be justified where the “carriage of 
contraband formed an important part of her venture.”211 The UK and U.S. governments 
were prepared to compromise in 1909 and allow the Declaration to reflect the European 
approach, which was based upon percentage of cargo, rather than the mala fides of the 
neutral master, which was the basis of the Anglo-American approach.212 The French Prize 
Court had required 75 per cent of the cargo to be contraband before the vessel could be 
condemned. On the other hand, the decision in the 1799 Jonge Margaretha case213 was an 
early example of the Anglo-American approach. Sir William Scott declined to confiscate 
the vessel in addition to the cargo, because “the party has acted without dissimulation in 
the case and may have been misled by an inattention to circumstances to which in 
strictness he ought to have adverted.”214 
Following Great Britain’s abandonment of the Declaration of London, the English 
court remained loyal to its forbears. In The Kim and others (Condemnation of ships) [1920], Sir 
Henry Duke relied on the vessel owner’s knowledge of contraband carriage to justify 
condemnation of the vessels in question, without reference to the percentage of cargo.215 
The Japanese Higher Prize Court also adopted this reasoning in The M.S. Dollar and The 
Wyefield cases during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5.216 However, in each of these cases 
the court found that the contraband items had formed a substantial proportion of the 
goods, so the judgment would have been the same on either approach. Relevant State 
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practice is somewhat old, but indicates there is no rule of international law favouring one 
approach over the other. 
 
5. Future Development  
 
a. Navigation Certificates 
 
By a navigation certificate, commonly abbreviated to “navicert,” a neutral ship subjected 
itself to inspection by belligerent authorities prior to sailing from a neutral port. It would 
receive certification that it was not carrying contraband and thus be guaranteed freedom 
from interference from the certifying belligerent State. Navicerts were most fully developed 
by Great Britain during the world wars.217 A similar system to Britain’s was adopted in 
some detail in the 1939 Harvard Draft Convention.218 The Harvard system was primarily 
designed to safeguard inter-neutral trade, and was only applicable to neutral-belligerent 
trade where there had been specific agreement between the neutral power and the 
belligerents.  
The British system began as voluntary for neutral shippers. For the shipper, the benefit 
was being safeguarded from interference en route from at least one belligerent. For Britain, 
it reduced the necessity for naval vessels to conduct visit and search operations, allowing 
them to be re-tasked elsewhere. However, the United States objected that neutral 
compliance with the navicert regime might breach neutrality in two ways. The first was that 
the neutral power that allowed the inspections to take place in its territory permitted its 
neutrality to be violated; the second was that the neutral vessel which became so certified 
was engaging in unneutral service.219 Nonetheless, Great Britain expanded the scheme by 
an Order-in-Council of July 31, 1940, which declared that any vessel not carrying a navicert 
was liable to capture and condemnation as a prize on this ground alone.220 This effectively 
made navicerts compulsory for neutral traders hoping to avoid interference from British 
warships. 
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Modern military manuals do not consider the exercise of a navicert system as a 
violation of neutral territory nor a species of unneutral service on the part of compliant 
vessels. NWP 1-14M and the German Commander’s Handbook expressly adopt this 
position.221 The Helsinki Principles address the practice in similar terms.222 The San Remo, 
UK and Chinese manuals do not specifically address the issue. None of the sources go so 
far as to say that absence of a navicert is a sufficient ground in itself for capture, but equally 
none asserts that it cannot be. 
It is likely that the navicert system will retain its place in contemporary law, although 
the method of its implementation may change. Surface navies have shrunk drastically since 
the Second World War. In any future conflict, States will likely not have the capacity or 
desire to employ their warships and auxiliaries in the conduct of visit and search 
operations. Even the Second World War navicert system is reasonably resource-intensive. 
It requires the forward deployment of civilian inspectors to key neutral ports. It seems 
likely that, in the future, the navicert system will develop so that it can be performed using 
electronic means, perhaps by uploading bills of lading to a database for inspection 
remotely. A spot-checking system might be needed as back up and enforcement. 
Heintschel von Heinegg has also made this observation and suggested further that neutral 
States’ own export controls may render the need for belligerent contraband controls of any 
form obsolete in future.223 
A side effect of the navicert system is its impact on the business of prize courts. The 
universal adoption by Great Britain of compulsory navicerts in the Second World War was 
partly responsible for the enormous reduction in the number of cases before the English 
Prize Court when compared to the First World War.224 The reason for this is simple: 
certifying ships before they sail eliminates the need to visit, search and subsequently 
capture them and bring them into port for prize adjudication. The regime prevented many 
                                                                                                                                               
221. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.4.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 263. 
222. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.2.6., cmt. at 511. 
223. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II, 
Developments since 1945, 30 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 89–90, 133–34 (1992) 
[hereinafter Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part II]. 
224. Fitzmaurice, supra note 145, at 74. He also sets out other factors which reduced the number of prize 
cases in the English court in the Second World War in comparison to the First. These were that the 
precedent established in prize cases in 1914–18 reduced the need for litigation, during the Second World War 
there were fewer neutral countries bordering Germany than in the First, the declared Allied operational zones 
in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean meant that many vessels which would otherwise be taken as prize were 
instead sunk, and the Allied practice of diverting vessels to a home port for visit and search. 
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who might be tempted to carry contraband from doing so, because they would not be able 
to obtain a certificate and, as an uncertified vessel, they were virtually certain to be stopped 
and captured. Even when uncertified vessels were captured, once it had been determined 
that the absence of a certificate was sufficient grounds in itself for capture and 
condemnation, there was little to be argued or achieved by the neutral trader in contesting 
prize litigation. The UK Manual asserts in a footnote that the UK is unlikely to employ the 
prize court in future; it has been roundly criticized for so doing.225 However, it is certainly 
true in the context of contraband enforcement that a navicert regime renders the future use 
of prize courts highly unlikely. 
 
b. The Commercial Adventure Doctrine 
 
Hague XIII, Article 6, provides that neutral States are forbidden to supply “warships, 
ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever” to belligerent States.226 Conversely, 
neutral States are under no duty to prevent their citizens or subjects from supplying war 
material to belligerents. This principle is enshrined in Hague V and XIII at common Article 
7: “A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either 
belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an 
army or fleet.” This is the commercial adventure doctrine. It was affirmed as recently as 
2009 by the drafters of the Air and Missile Warfare Manual, which provides: “A Neutral is 
not bound to prevent the private export or transit on behalf of a Belligerent Party of 
aircraft, parts of aircraft, or material, supplies or munitions for aircraft.”227 
While the commercial adventure doctrine allows neutral traders to trade in contraband, 
they do so at their own risk. The risk of belligerent interception and confiscation is carried 
by the neutral trader. This point was made clear by the UK Privy Council in The Louisiana: 
“according to international law, neutrals may during a war trade freely as well with 
belligerents as with other neutrals. If, however, the goods in which they trade are in their 
                                                                                                                                               
225. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.89 n.103. For criticism, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 248 (2010). In response to this 
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note 131, at 107. 
226. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 6. See also Convention on Maritime Neutrality, supra note 116, art. 15. 
227. AMW MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 173. See also Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare art. 45, Feb. 19, 1923, 
reprinted in 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 12 (1938) (not in force). 
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nature contraband, the traffic includes certain risks.” Their Lordships described the neutral 
trader’s position before the Prize Court as “not in the position of a person charged with a 
criminal offence. . . . He comes before the Prize Court to show that there was no 
reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure or to displace such reasonable suspicion as in 
fact exists.”228 
This traditional understanding of the doctrine may now be in doubt, particularly in 
relation to the arms trade.229 As early as 1939, the commentary to the Harvard Draft 
Convention expressed the view that the law might be developing in favour of a duty on 
neutral States to prohibit private arms exports, and supported that development.230 The 
Draft Convention stopped short of including such a prohibition, merely providing that 
neutral States were permitted to control or prohibit the export or transit through its 
territory of arms or other war supplies to belligerents.231 The commentary gives examples 
of State practice in voluntary controls on arms exports dating back to the eighteenth 
century.232 
Some argue that, while the law may long have recognized such voluntary controls, the 
nature of the modern arms trade might now mean that any sale of arms from a neutral to a 
belligerent State is unlawful.233 They argue that virtually all international arms sales now 
require some exercise of government power or control. This might be because the State 
has a significant ownership share in an outwardly private arms company, or because States 
choose to impose monopolistic controls on all arms sales. In either circumstance, a sale of 
arms or ammunition by a neutral private trader to a belligerent power is likely to necessitate 
direct involvement and supervision of the public power, and constitute a breach of that 
State’s duties under Hague XIII, Article 6.234 However, State practice on the control of 
arms sales to belligerents since the Second World War is inconsistent, and can only support 
the view that neutral States are permitted, rather than obliged, to enact controls on arms 
                                                                                                                                               
228. The Louisiana, supra note 182, 464–65. For a similar view expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court, see 
Northern Pacific Railway Company v. The American Trading Company, 195 U.S. 439 (1904). This case is discussed in 
Scott, supra note 161, at 325. 
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232. Id., cmt. at 283–99. 
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NEUTRALITY 419 (1998); Bothe, supra note 18, ¶ 1112; NEFF, supra note 9, at 200–203. 
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sales during armed conflicts.235 Nonetheless, States which have domestic arms control laws 
obviously remain bound to apply them during an armed conflict. Growing support for the 
Arms Trade Treaty, which would place tighter controls on the international arms trade 
even in peacetime, might eventually spell the end of the commercial adventure doctrine as 
far as arms and ammunition are concerned.236 
 
6. Contraband: Closing Remarks 
 
Modern military manuals continue to reflect the traditional law of contraband, indicating a 
marked desire among States to preserve their belligerent rights. While States are carefully 
preserving their positions in case of future need, even in conflicts where interference with 
the enemy’s trade is justified the future exercise of contraband control is likely to be 
fundamentally different to that prior to 1945. The reduction in the number of naval 
platforms operated by most States will drive a desire to rely less on traditional visit and 
search, and more upon cargo pre-inspection and spot-checks, possibly conducted 
electronically. The Tallinn Manual contemplates that naval blockades might be enforced by 
cyber means—there is no reason in principle why the same should not be true of 
contraband measures.237 
States might be unwilling to engage in confiscation as prize of captured cargo and 
material which they cannot readily convert to their own use. Prize proceedings require, in 
addition to the convening of a prize court and the retention of admiralty practitioners, 
warehouse storage facilities; berthing space for captured vessels; administrative 
infrastructure, including value assessors; and even accommodation for captured crews. This 
administrative effort might be disproportionately onerous to the military benefit gained. 
Weighed against the practical challenges of administering prize proceedings, the navicert 
regime discussed above seems particularly attractive. Taken together, these facts will likely 
contribute to a significant reduction, if not abandonment altogether, of prize court use in 
the future. For example, during enforcement of the Gaza blockade, the Israeli government 
                                                                                                                                               
235. See id. at 485–503 for a detailed discussion of State practice in regulating arms sales during the 
Falklands War and the Iran-Iraq War. 
236. See About the Arms Trade, UN OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www. 
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did not seek to convert or confiscate captured vessels and cargo. They simply repatriated 
them as soon as investigative and evidence gathering considerations allowed.238 
Lastly, the law of contraband demonstrates interesting shifts in the positions taken by 
both the U.S. and the UK over the course of the twentieth century. The U.S., so often a 
defender of the rights of the neutral prior to the Second World War, now adopts the most 
heavily pro-belligerent position.239 This trend will be demonstrated in other areas of the 
law. Meanwhile, the UK’s retreat from a fiercely pro-belligerent stance, demonstrated by 
positions taken at the Hague conferences, the London Conference and in both world wars, 
is evidenced in its Manual which takes a more measured position, choosing to adopt 
(verbatim in many respects) the text of the San Remo Manual. 
 
B. The Rule of 1756 (Engaging in a Forbidden Trade) 
 
The Rule of 1756 is the usual name for the rule forbidding a neutral trader from availing 
himself of a line of trade with a belligerent in wartime which is unknown to him in 
peacetime. It actually significantly predates 1756 and traditionally referred to trade between 
a colony and the belligerent colonial power.240 Almost without exception, colonial powers 
exercised strict monopolies over the trade of their colonies in order to maximize their own 
economic returns. However, in the 1756 war between France and England, France granted 
to neutral Dutch vessels the right to carry goods from French colonies to France.241 This 
was an attempt to place those goods beyond capture by England. 
Prior to the universal recognition of the “free ships, free goods” principle in the 1856 
Declaration of Paris, England had entered into a 1674 treaty with the Netherlands which 
provided that, in the event of war between England and any other country, goods 
belonging to England’s enemy in Dutch ships would remain free from seizure.242 The 
English Prize Court nonetheless found that Dutch ships carrying French colonial trade 
                                                                                                                                               
238. See infra pp. 69-73. 
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241. NEFF, supra note 9, at 65. 
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were exempt from England’s treaty obligation to the Netherlands.243 Sir William Scott later 
explained the rule in The Immanuel (1799):  
 
[T]he general rule is, that the neutral has a right to carry on in time of war, his accustomed 
trade to the utmost extent of which that accustomed trade is capable. Very different is the case 
of a trade which the neutral has never possessed, which he holds no title of use and habit in 
time of peace. . . .244 
 
The basis of the Rule of 1756 was that the neutral was rendering service to a belligerent 
inconsistent with the neutral duty of impartiality. In essence, the neutral vessel was trading 
for the enemy belligerent, rather than with him.245 The penalty for infraction of the Rule 
was accordingly severe—forfeiture of not only the offending cargo, but also the vessel.246 
However, the English Prize Court treated that penalty as discretionary and, in at least two 
cases, chose in the circumstances only to condemn the cargo.247 
Whether the rule was ever reflective of customary law is a matter of doubt. Sir William 
Scott, in a later case, ruled that French State practice indicated that the French government 
recognized the rule as one of international law.248 A version of the rule was enforced by the 
Japanese Prize Court during the Russo-Japanese War. In The Montara, decided in 1906, the 
Japanese Higher Prize Court expressly relied on it to sanction capture of a neutral vessel 
engaged in small coastal trade in Russia, trade which was normally open only to Russians. 
The Japanese court ruled that the Rule of 1756 remained a rule of international law.249 
The Rule of 1756 was not addressed at all by the Hague XIII delegates. The British 
government also specifically excluded it from the scope of the 1909 Declaration of 
London, indicating perhaps a desire that the rule be unmolested.250 The 1939 commentary 
to the Harvard Draft Convention opined that breach of the “famous” Rule of 1756 might 
constitute unneutral service and justify capture, but nothing more than that was said and 
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no substantive provision was included in the Draft Convention.251 The present author has 
not found a prize case since The Montara which relies on the rule as a ground for capture or 
condemnation. It is not reflected in any of the modern military manuals surveyed. The 
rule’s origin in the context of colonial trade heavily suggests that it has fallen into 
desuetude. However, it had lain practically dormant for over one hundred years before 
being employed in Japan in 1906. This reliance placed upon it by the Japanese government 
in a wholly novel context allows for a very remote possibility that the rule could be invoked 
in some new way by States in future conflicts. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
251. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, cmt. at 658–59. 
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PART FOUR: BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE SEA 
 
Part Three examined belligerent States’ authority to place controls on their enemy’s trade, 
including where this trade is carried out by neutral vessels. This Part examines the 
circumstances in which belligerent States may place controls over areas of the sea, even to 
the detriment of neutral shipping. The legal concepts of blockade, maritime zones and 
control of shipping in the immediate vicinity of naval operations are examined. Blockade is 
a device allowing belligerent States to control access to and egress from an area of enemy 
coast. Maritime zones, a relatively new and still controversial concept, may allow 
belligerents to establish controls, including the exclusion of neutral shipping, over 
operationally significant sea areas. They might be static geographically defined zones, or 
they might be mobile zones around a moving belligerent warship or other unit. Finally, the 
law has long accepted that belligerents may place controls on all shipping in the immediate 
vicinity of their naval operations. These three concepts are designed to allow the belligerent 
to have an effect on its enemy, but each has the ability significantly to interfere with neutral 
ships exercising their freedoms of trade and navigation. 
 
A. Blockade 
 
In 1997, Captain Humphrey, then Chief Naval Judge Advocate of the UK Royal Navy, 
wrote:  
 
The experiences and practices in the two world wars left the law of blockade devoid of most of 
its traditional characteristics and made its applicability and content post 1945 questionable. The 
practical effect may be that formal blockade in the sense of close visible investment has 
become obsolete and resort has to be had to other methods such as mine-laying and institution 
of war zones.252 
 
Nonetheless, in recent years classic blockade has been twice employed by Israel—in 2006 
in Lebanon and in 2009 in Gaza.253 There was broad agreement that the legal regime which 
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governed those blockades was the traditional law of naval warfare and maritime 
neutrality.254 This Part will first assess the legal requirements for a blockade. It will then 
address whether they are suitably robust to accommodate modern weapon systems and 
platforms before considering the Gaza blockade as a case study. 
Blockade is the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast or ports for the purpose 
of preventing the ingress and egress of ships and aircraft of all States.255 It has been 
described as  
 
a sort of circumvallation around a place, by which all foreign connexion [sic] and 
correspondence is, as far as human force can effect it, to be entirely cut off. It is intended to 
suspend the entire commerce of that place; and a neutral is no more at liberty to assist the 
traffic of exportation than importation.256  
 
To be lawful, a blockade must comply with five requirements: notification, effectiveness, 
impartiality, proportionality and the preservation of access to neutral coasts. 
 
1. Notification 
 
With the exception of the Chinese Manual, which does not deal with the criteria for a 
lawful blockade, the manuals surveyed uniformly state that all aspects of a blockade must 
be formally notified.257 Under the traditional law, the mode of notification depended upon 
the manner in which the blockade was established. A blockade established by a 
government was obliged to be formally notified to other governments. Prior to the advent 
of instant global communications, the law also allowed a blockade to be established de 
                                                                                                                                               
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia instead described Russian Black Sea Fleet 
activity as enforcement of a “maritime security zone.” FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 144, at 212. 
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MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.65; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S 
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aerial blockades. 
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facto by a naval commander on the scene, provided he had prior authorization to do so 
from his government. Such blockades required specific notification to every vessel 
approaching the blockaded coast.258 
Before a merchant vessel may be held to have breached a blockade, the blockading 
State must be able to prove the vessel knew or ought to have known of the blockade’s 
existence. The traditional law was unclear as to what evidence was sufficient to prove 
knowledge. The Anglo-American approach diverged from the European approach. The 
former attributed knowledge to vessels flagged to neutral States whose governments had 
been duly notified so long as there had been sufficient time for the vessels to be informed. 
The European approach required each potential blockade runner to have been individually 
notified by the blockading force.259 The Ringende Jacob is an early case demonstrating the 
Anglo-American approach.260 The eponymous vessel was caught apparently trying to 
breach the English blockade of Amsterdam during the 1780–84 Anglo-Dutch War. Sir 
William Scott sought specific evidence that she had left her port of origin, Riga, after notice 
of the blockade had reached there. Only then would he impute knowledge of the blockade 
to the vessel’s master.261 As observed in a prize court decision in the following year, vessels 
within a blockaded port need not be specifically notified, because “it is impossible for 
those within to be ignorant of the forcible suspension of their commerce; the notoriety of 
the thing supersedes the necessity of particular notice to each ship.”262 
Modern military manuals do not prescribe the manner of notification. In the case of 
the Israeli blockades in 2006 and 2009, notification was achieved by the publication of 
Notices to Mariners.263 The AMW Manual states that aerial blockades should be notified by 
a Notice to Airmen.264 In light of the lack of objection to the Israeli practice and the 
position of the AMW Manual, it may be concluded that these are now the most 
appropriate means to publicize a blockade. 
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2. Effectiveness 
 
A blockade must be effective.265 Effectiveness is a question of fact, determined by the risk 
of capture faced by vessels attempting to breach the blockade. There must be sufficient 
danger of capture before the blockade can be considered effective.266 Dangerousness does 
not necessitate interception of every blockade runner, but sufficient military resources must 
be committed to render it probable that vessels and aircraft will be prevented from entering 
or leaving the blockaded area. The dangerousness requirement has its origins in the 
protection of neutral rights. Found in Article 4 of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, it is 
grounded in the neutral desire that belligerent powers not be permitted to declare “paper 
blockades” without the means or motive to enforce them. In determining dangerousness, 
the distance of the blockading force from the coast and the nature of the blockading force 
will be relevant factors. 
As to the blockade’s distance from the coast, there are two related but distinct 
questions. The first is at what distance from the coast may the blockade be declared? The 
second is, once declared, where might the blockade be enforced? In the blockade 
paradigm, the blockading State declares a blockade line around an area of enemy coast and 
places a squadron of warships on or near the blockade line to enforce it. This archetypal 
blockade was contemplated by the States declaring the First Armed Neutrality in 1780–83, 
which required that the blockading force be “anchored and sufficiently near” the enemy 
coast.267 In the view of these States at the time, only such a close blockade was permissible 
in law: “The immediate entrance to a port must be guarded by stationary vessels, in such 
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number as either to render entrance impossible, or at least to expose any ships running in 
to a cross fire from the guns of two of them.”268 
On the Anglo-American view, so long as the blockade remained effective, the distance 
of the blockading force from the coast was irrelevant. This view balances locating the 
blockading force so close to the coast that it may be at risk from enemy onshore weaponry, 
and locating it so far away that the blockade may fail for want of effectiveness.269 In 1854, 
Riga was blockaded at a distance of one hundred and twenty miles from the coast by a 
single ship in the Lyser Ort, a narrow channel forming the only navigable entrance to the 
Gulf of Riga. This blockade was held to be effective by the English Prize Court.270 The 
contemporary military manuals surveyed and the San Remo and AMW manuals all adopt 
the Anglo-American approach. These manuals provide that the distance from the coast 
that the force maintaining the blockade is located is dependent upon military 
requirements.271 International reaction to the Israeli blockades of 2006 and 2009, although 
sometimes critical of the nature and place of Israeli enforcement action, did not demure 
from the Anglo-American approach to the distance question.272 
The looser Anglo-American approach means there is no need for a formal blockade 
line so long as the blockading force is effective at preventing vessels from entering or 
leaving the blockaded ports or coast. None of the contemporary military manuals surveyed 
refer to any requirement for a blockade line. The Harvard Draft Convention posited the 
creation of a blockade zone as an area of water inside a blockade line in which it was 
forbidden for merchant vessels to enter. The Convention commentary was clear that this 
did not reflect contemporary law, but suggested it might be a useful concept for 
belligerents establishing blockades.273 Nonetheless, the blockade zone has not been 
adopted in any of the manuals surveyed. Israel’s blockade of Gaza did include a declared 
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blockade line and a blockade zone behind it, but neither the line nor the zone is an 
essential requirement of a blockade. 
As to where a lawfully established blockade may be enforced, there are two positions: 
(1) that a blockade may only be enforced in the vicinity of the blockaded area and (2) that a 
State which has properly established a blockade may enforce it anywhere it likes, so long as 
it can show that the object vessel intends to breach the blockade.274 Traditionally, the 
European approach espoused the more restrictive position, while the Anglo-American 
approach adopted the intention doctrine.275 The European approach was adopted in the 
1909 Declaration of London after both the UK and U.S. conceded the point in 
negotiations.276 The San Remo Manual offered no view on the intention doctrine. NWP 1-
14M still expressly embraces it;277 the UK Manual is silent on the issue. The German 
Manual states that a vessel may only be captured for breach of blockade if it “has 
attempted to leave or approach the blockaded area.”278 While far from explicit, this implies 
a rejection of the intention doctrine. In the view of the present author, the doctrine is 
unsustainable in the contemporary law. The Gaza blockade case study will amplify this 
position. 
The traditional law had little to say on the nature of the blockading force. The 1856 
Declaration of Paris, Article 4, provides: “Blockades, in order to be binding, must be 
effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coats 
of the enemy.” Anglo-American prize decisions affirmed that a blockade enforced by a 
single vessel could be effective if the capabilities of that single ship rendered the blockade 
effective on the facts.279 
More recently, there has been some dispute as to whether a blockade may be enforced 
by a naval minefield alone. In 1972, the United States mined North Vietnamese waters off 
Haiphong and successfully denied access to and egress from that port for some three 
hundred days.280 This action was justified by the U.S. as a measure of self-defence and 
never referred to as a blockade, although the modern NWP 1-14M states expressly that 
                                                                                                                                               
274. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 293–4. 
275. Gregory, supra note 259, at 345. 
276. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 17; NEFF, supra note 9, at 139. 
277. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.4. 
278. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 301. 
279. E.g., The Olinde Rodrigues (1899), supra note 266, at 517. 
280. Humphrey, supra note 252, at 31. 
 62 
 
 
blockade by minefield alone is lawful, citing the Haiphong mining in support.281 The U.S. 
view might be criticized on the grounds that an unmanned blockade risks unintended harm 
to, for example, a vessel in distress or one that is ignorant of the blockade.282 Some 
commentators have suggested that blockade by minefield alone would be lawful only so 
long as the blockading State provided sufficient monitoring to prevent unintended harm.283 
A second criticism is that the prescribed penalty for breach of blockade is capture, not 
destruction or attack (unless capture is resisted), which manifestly cannot be achieved by a 
minefield.284 However, a properly notified minefield can be such a strong deterrent that 
there are no breaches and, therefore, no penalties to be applied. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq enforced a declared maritime exclusion zone by the use 
of air assets alone.285 The purpose of the Iraqi zone was blockade-like, although never 
described as a blockade. It was intended to prevent oil tankers accessing the Iranian oil 
infrastructure. Iraq’s enforcement of the zone was justly criticized on the grounds that it 
was indiscriminate and excessive; Iraq used fighter aircraft to attack merchant vessels in 
and approaching the zone.286 However, there is no reason in principle why a blockade (or a 
lawful zone) may not be enforced by air assets alone so long as the blockade is effective 
and enforcement activity is sufficiently discriminate and proportionate.287 
The Tallinn Manual, Rule 67, states: “Cyber methods and means of warfare may be 
used to maintain and enforce a naval or aerial blockade provided that they do not, alone or 
in combination with other methods, result in acts inconsistent with the law of international 
armed conflict.” In the accompanying commentary, the Manual suggests that “[r]emote 
access cyber operations against propulsion and navigation systems are examples of the sort 
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of cyber operations that can support naval blockades.”288 As cyber capabilities develop, this 
is another example of how a blockade might now lawfully be enforced without any physical 
presence in the blockaded area. However, the enforcement activity contemplated by the 
Tallinn Manual—targeting propulsion and navigation systems—could leave the object 
vessel at risk and might generate a monitoring requirement, akin to the argument in respect 
of blockade by minefield. This is obviously a developing area of the law and the scope of 
the rule cannot yet be determined. 
 
3. Impartiality 
 
A blockade must be applied impartially, that is, it must be enforced against vessels from all 
States, whether neutral or belligerent, regardless of the nature of the goods they are 
carrying. The traditional reason for the impartiality requirement was to ensure that the 
blockading State could not improperly benefit from the declaration of a blockade by 
allowing its own merchant vessels to trade to the exclusion of all others. Modern manuals 
continue to reflect the rule.289 The Turkish government criticized the Israeli blockade of 
Gaza for failing uniformly to enforce the blockade.290 This criticism was misguided, relying 
as it did upon evidence which pre-dated the Israeli declaration of blockade, but it 
nonetheless reflects the widespread contemporary view of the continuing validity of the 
impartiality rule. 
Failure to comply with the impartiality rule renders the entire blockade void. 
Accordingly, the blockading power must lift it. Before the failed blockade is lifted a 
merchant vessel may not disobey or ignore a notified blockade because it unilaterally 
considers the blockade unlawful. However, captures on the basis of a failed blockade 
should be found unlawful during subsequent prize proceedings, and vessels and cargo 
restored.291 
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It is argued below that there is no rule of law that a maritime zone must be enforced 
impartially.292 Indeed, enforcement of a zone only against enemy shipping, as opposed to 
against all shipping, helps ensure the zone’s impact on neutrals is not disproportionate. 
This logic applies equally to a blockade. The traditional motivation for the impartiality rule 
lacks contemporary relevance and it would be a favourable development in the law if it 
were removed from the law of blockade. This would allow the blockading belligerent to 
focus only on preventing access to, or egress from, the blockaded coast which had an 
immediate military benefit, while reducing the potential for economic impact upon neutral 
traders. 
 
4. Proportionality 
 
This dissertation groups the three rules which limit the effect a blockade can have on the 
civilian population of the blockaded territory under the general heading “proportionality.” 
They are not, strictly, all rules of proportionality, but they are so interrelated that 
contemporary manuals, as will be seen, often deal with them in the same provision or rule. 
The three rules are: (1) a blockade may not be intended to starve civilians; (2) a blockade 
may not inflict suffering which is disproportionate to the military advantage it confers; and 
(3) a blockade must not prevent supply to the civilian population of items essential to their 
survival.293  
The first rule is an outright ban on a blockade that has as its sole purpose the starvation 
of civilians. NWP 1-14M, the German Commander’s Handbook and the San Remo Manual 
state the rule in these terms.294 The UK Manual says that a blockade will be unlawful if it is 
“intended to starve” the civilian population.295 This appears broader than the sole purpose 
threshold. The AMW Manual also prefers a broader interpretation of the rule, stating that a 
blockade will be unlawful if it has the “sole or primary” purpose of starving civilians.296 
Sole appears to be a very high threshold such that it might render the starvation rule of 
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very limited practical application. Even where a blockading belligerent is unscrupulous 
enough to impose a blockade in order to starve civilians, it will likely be possible to 
attribute some other military advantage to the blockade which might help it evade being in 
noncompliance of this rule. It is easy to see why the UK and the drafters of the AMW 
Manual preferred a broader statement of it. 
The second rule is a rule of proportionality. A blockade is prohibited if the damage 
caused to the civil population is excessive compared to the expected military advantage 
conferred. The military manuals surveyed and the San Remo Manual agree that this rule 
limits the establishment of blockades just as it does any other military activity.297 It is clear 
that the sort of damage contemplated in this rule is starvation or, perhaps more broadly, 
hunger.298 This rule is broader than the starvation rule, and includes blockades which 
incidentally cause starvation or hunger, in addition to those intended to starve civilians. 
Abolition of the impartiality requirement, recommended above, would also assist blockades 
remain proportionate. Enforcement activity could then lawfully be focused on vessels 
whose breach of the blockade has a military effect. The current requirement that a 
blockade be uniformly enforced renders its impact on the blockaded population necessarily 
more onerous than it would if the impartiality rule were abolished. 
The third rule is that a blockade must not deprive the civilian population of items 
essential to its survival. It is reflected in all contemporary manuals save for the Chinese 
Manual, which, as has already been observed, does not deal with the specific criteria for a 
lawful blockade.299 Essential items include items involved in the production of foodstuffs 
and medical supplies, and perhaps heating fuel, depending on the circumstances of the 
blockaded population. The blockading power retains the right to determine the technical 
arrangements for how such items are provided to the population of the blockaded 
territory.300 The denial does not have to be intended by the blockading State for the blockade 
to be unlawful under this rule. However, when a blockading State makes technical 
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arrangements for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the blockaded territory, merchant 
vessels carrying it are obliged to abide by those technical arrangements. As a matter of lex 
lata, vessels carrying humanitarian aid have no right simply to sail through the blockade, as 
they might do if the impartiality rule was abolished. To describe this third rule as a “duty of 
free passage” binding upon the blockading State is not an accurate assessment of the 
current law, although it would be a desirable development.301 
 
5. Preservation of Access to Neutral Coast 
 
All of the manuals surveyed except the Chinese Manual assert that a blockade must not 
block access to a neutral State’s coastline.302 The AMW Manual reflects this position, but 
also explicitly states that an aerial blockade must not bar access to straits used for 
international navigation or archipelagic sea lanes.303 The Manual’s commentary claims that 
the origin for this rule is the law of naval blockade.304 
What is meant by access? Historically, the term meant physical access by vessels and 
aircraft. The Tallinn Manual preserves this definition in respect of naval and aerial 
blockades, whether enforced by cyber or traditional means. Some of the Tallinn drafters 
accepted the concept of a pure cyber blockade. Those who did considered that access to 
neutral cyberspace and infrastructure must also be preserved during such a blockade.305 
 
6. Breach of Blockade 
 
The San Remo Manual and the UK Manual provide that a vessel may be captured if there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is breaching or attempting to breach the 
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blockade.306 If the blockading State has declared a blockade line, crossing or attempting to 
cross it would certainly constitute grounds for capture. Under the intention doctrine a 
vessel’s public declaration of an intention to breach the blockade would be sufficient 
grounds for capture wherever the vessel is located.307 Other conduct which would 
constitute grounds for capture includes loitering near the blockaded area, failing to answer 
radio communication from the blockading force, failure to display night navigation lights 
or other attempts at concealment.308 
The doctrine of continuous voyage, discussed earlier in the context of contraband, was 
never recognized as a method of breaching a blockade.309 In The Jonge Pieter case the English 
Prize Court asserted:  
 
The blockade of Amsterdam is, from the nature of the thing, a partial blockade, a blockade by 
sea; and if the goods were going to Embden, with an ulterior destination by land to 
Amsterdam, or by an interior canal navigation, it is not, according to my conception, a breach 
of blockade.310  
 
Although rejecting continuous voyage in the case of blockade, English prize law held that if 
a vessel were intercepted en route to a neutral port from which it intended subsequently to 
sail to a blockaded port, it might be captured.311 English law at the time recognized the 
intention doctrine, so no reliance needed to be placed upon continuous voyage in making 
this finding. American prize law took the same view.312 No contemporary manuals 
expressly rely on continuous voyage in the case of blockade; indeed, the German 
Commander’s Handbook expressly rejects it.313 
The law of blockade was traditionally the only lawful means of interference with enemy 
exports. Thus, a blockade was breached as much by egress from the blockaded port as 
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entrance to it.314 Definitions in military manuals continue to support the view that vessels 
leaving a blockaded area are as liable to capture as those entering it.315 
The traditional penalty for breach of blockade is capture, subject to later adjudication 
before a prize court. This position continues to be reflected in the surveyed manuals.316 In 
many circumstances, however, there will be no need to capture a vessel to enforce the 
blockade, even though the blockading State is lawfully entitled to do so. Simply ordering 
the vessel to divert will often suffice.317 Diversions preserve the effectiveness of the 
blockade and do not require the blockade commander to expend valuable resources 
capturing the vessel, appointing a prize crew and tasking one of his warships to escort it to 
the nearest home port. Even where vessels are captured, there may be no necessity or 
appetite to confiscate the vessel as prize. After Israel enforced the Gaza blockade against 
the so-called Freedom Flotilla, the vessels and crew were repatriated to their home States 
and no prize proceedings were initiated. This is another example of a development which 
limits the likelihood of future prize court use. 
If a merchant vessel clearly resists capture, it may be warned that it might be attacked if 
it persists.318 By analogy, a vessel which resists other enforcement activity (such as a simple 
diversion) may also be warned that it may be attacked if it persists. The legal basis for this 
position is that clear resistance renders a merchant vessel a military objective, that is, a 
prima facie lawful target for attack. Clear resistance is a question of fact in each 
circumstance, but the threshold is a high one. Mere evasion or attempting to flee without 
persisting in breaching the blockade is not sufficient. Firing upon the blockade force or 
attempting to ram a blockading warship would meet the threshold, as was the case in the 
Second World War when the British government instructed its merchant ships to resist 
boardings and attempt to ram German U-boats.319 Even though a resisting vessel is a lawful 
target, before a commander may attack it he is obliged to weigh the likely military 
advantage to be obtained from attacking it against the number of civilian casualties the 
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attack would be expected collaterally to cause. Incidental injuries to civilians are sometimes 
an inevitable consequence of a lawful attack on a legitimate military objective and are not 
inherently unlawful unless they are excessive.320 However, the commander bears a strict 
duty to take all feasible measures to keep them to a minimum.321 
What sort of military advantage might attacking the vessel confer? Most obvious is that 
allowing a vessel through the blockade seriously calls into question the blockade’s 
effectiveness, especially if the action is part of a coordinated campaign to undermine it. 
After all, an ineffective blockade must be abandoned. Or it might be known that the 
resisting vessel is carrying cargo that will make a valuable contribution to the enemy’s 
military effort ashore.  
 
7. A Case Study: the Gaza Blockade 
 
Many issues of controversy in the law of blockade were thrown into sharp relief by Israel’s 
blockade of Gaza. In May 2010, a flotilla of six ships gathered in the eastern Mediterranean 
with the publically declared purpose of breaching Israel’s blockade of Gaza. The Mavi 
Marmara was the largest ship in the flotilla. It carried activists from the Free Gaza 
Movement, the Turkish charity “Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief” (known as IHH), others sympathetic to the circumstances of the 
people of Gaza and numerous journalists. IHH’s reputation has been described as 
“chequered,” with reported links to Islamic extremist organizations, including Al Qaeda.322 
In a series of communications culminating late on May 30, Israel informed the flotilla that 
unless it diverted to Ashdod, an Israeli city to the north of Gaza, and allowed its cargo to 
be inspected and distributed under Israeli control, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) personnel 
would board the vessels and prevent them from reaching the Gaza coast. When the flotilla 
refused to divert, the IDF boarded the ships sixty-four nautical miles outside of the 
declared blockade zone; five were captured without loss of life. On board the Mavi 
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Marmara, however, nine civilian activists were killed during clashes with the IDF boarding 
party. 
Three significant panels of inquiry have investigated the incident. Facts found and legal 
conclusions reached by the three panels vary greatly. Israel’s inquiry was led by Supreme 
Court Justice Emeritus Jacob Turkel.323 The Turkel Commission’s report concludes the 
Israeli blockade was lawful as a matter of international law and that the Israeli enforcement 
operation was, in the main, similarly lawful. The Turkish National Commission of Inquiry 
included representatives from the Prime Minister’s office and other government offices.324 
The weight of the Turkish Report’s analysis and conclusions are therefore regrettably 
diminished because of its transparent political motivation. It concludes the blockade was 
unlawful and that the Israeli boarding operation, which it describes as an “attack,” used 
excessive force. Both these reports were provided to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
who established his own commission headed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer to consider the 
incident.325 The Palmer Report takes into account the findings of the two national inquiries 
and concludes that, while the establishment of the blockade was lawful, the Israeli boarding 
operation appeared to use excessive force in dealing with the passengers and crew of the 
Mavi Marmara.  
The case highlights two questions in particular which warrant consideration: whether 
the intention doctrine reflects the law and what level of force may be employed in 
capturing a vessel in enforcement of a blockade. These will be considered in turn. 
With respect to the intention doctrine, the Turkish Report said the early enforcement 
of the blockade left no room for “peaceful and non-violent alternative measures to stop 
the vessels.”326 The Palmer Report agreed.327 These criticisms, while not specifically 
grounded in a legal objection to the intention doctrine, would likely be validly raised against 
every blockade enforcement action which relied upon it. It has already been seen that of 
the manuals surveyed only NWP 1-14M explicitly endorses the doctrine. The UK, once 
supportive, seems to have abandoned it. Whatever the doctrine’s status in the past, the 
present author believes the intention doctrine cannot be considered reflective of 
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contemporary customary law. The lack of support for the doctrine in contemporary 
manuals and the widespread criticism of Israeli reliance on it in 2010 lead to this 
conclusion. Purely as a matter of policy, use of the intention doctrine (even if lawful) is 
likely to be problematic. Belligerents often wish to court international support of their 
cause. The perception of over-zealous enforcement of rules that might heavily impact upon 
neutral States’ trade or use of the sea risks undermining that support. 
The question of permissible use of force in blockade enforcement actions is more 
complex. The Turkel Commission concluded there were around 570 civilians on board the 
Mavi Marmara who took no part in resisting the IDF’s attempts to board.328 If the vessel 
had been attacked and sunk with a large loss of life, this would surely have been an 
unacceptable level of incidental injury, particularly when the military advantage of 
preventing breach of the blockade could have been achieved by carrying out an opposed 
boarding and capturing the vessel, as the IDF in fact did.329  
Since a blockading force will be dealing almost exclusively with merchant vessels, the 
blockade commander’s starting point must always be that individuals on board the object 
vessel are civilians protected from attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.330 The International Committee for the Red Cross propounds the following 
test for whether an act amounts to direct participation: 
 
1. the act must be likely adversely to affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict; 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act done and the harm inflicted; and  
3. that act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.331 
 
If a commander is satisfied that this test is met by persons resisting boarding, then it is 
lawful for his forces to attack them. 
Additionally, members of the boarding party always retain their right to use force in 
personal self-defence or in defence of others. This may include lethal force where such 
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force is proportionate and necessary, for example, when there is an imminent threat to 
human life and there is no other way to extinguish the threat.332 There are, therefore, two 
legal bases upon which boarding parties may use force during a blockade enforcement 
action: (1) against those who directly participate in hostilities and (2) in self-defence. In 
many circumstances, members of the armed forces confronted with direct participants will 
be justified in using force in self-defence and will not need to consider the more complex 
direct participation formulation. That will not always be the case, however, as the Mavi 
Marmara case illustrates. 
Anticipating that they would be boarded, some persons on board the Mavi Marmara 
armed themselves in order physically to repel the IDF boarding party.333 The boarding 
party attempted to board by speedboat, but was unable to do so because some persons on 
board used water cannons and threw objects at the speedboats.334 After the speedboat 
boarding failed, three helicopters inserted the boarding party. There were reports that live 
fire was used from the helicopter against personnel on the upper deck of the Mavi Marmara, 
although this was denied by Israel.335 During the boarding, Israeli forces faced armed 
resistance. Israel claimed firearms were used against its forces, though none were found on 
board afterwards and this was denied by the activists. Before the boarding party gained 
control of the ship, nine activists were killed by firearms. The autopsies showed some of 
the bodies had multiple bullet wounds, some inflicted from behind and some at close 
range. 
The Turkel Commission devoted much time to considering (with the benefit of 
hindsight) which personnel on board the Mavi Marmara were directly participating in 
hostilities.336 The blockade force commander would have had far less knowledge than the 
Commission. Once the speedboat boarding was attempted and repelled, however, it would 
have been abundantly clear that there were individuals on board prepared forcibly to resist 
the IDF boarding. At that point it could have been concluded that the resisting members 
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of the passengers and crew were direct participants. If they could have been adequately 
identified and distinguished, they could lawfully have been targeted with sniper fire from 
the helicopter prior to the boarding team’s landing, as was alleged by the activists but 
denied by Israel. The Mavi Marmara experience, therefore, demonstrates circumstances 
where a direct participation analysis would allow a commander lawfully to use force in 
circumstances beyond self-defence. 
The Turkel Commission determined that it could not criticize the level of force used by 
the IDF in the fatal cases because of the level of resistance demonstrated and the 
consequent challenging operating environment.337 However there is much to commend the 
view of the Palmer Report, which concluded that Israel had provided insufficient evidence 
as to the circumstances of the deaths to allow the panel to conclude that each of the nine 
could have lawfully been targeted under the law of armed conflict (i.e., that the test for 
direct participation had been met in each case).338 The Panel of Inquiry members were 
rightly unpersuaded that the nine were lawfully killed in self-defence, because of the nature 
and number of the bullet wounds inflicted.339 
 
8. Blockade: Concluding Remarks 
 
The traditional law of blockade remains part of the customary international law of naval 
warfare. Despite a lack of consensus on every aspect of the law, the three investigations 
into the Mavi Marmara incident all relied on the classic law of blockade. However, this 
dissertation has offered the view that blockades should no longer be required to be 
impartial in order to be lawful. Abolition of this rule would allow blockades to be militarily 
effective, while avoiding unnecessary interference with neutral trade and without inflicting 
unnecessary deprivation upon the civilian population of the blockaded territory. 
It is also clear that blockade need not be enforced by capture in every instance. Simple 
diversion orders to vessels which would otherwise be in breach of blockade achieve the 
blockading State’s aim of ensuring that war-sustaining material does not enter the 
blockaded area. Capturing vessels and taking them for prize is onerous, time consuming 
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and resource intensive. In the Gaza case, even once the offending vessels were captured 
and brought within Israeli authority, the IDF commander did not resort to prize 
proceedings; the vessels and crews were repatriated when circumstances allowed. Without 
capture there is no need for prize proceedings, and the recent developments in the practice 
of blockade suggest again that prize courts are an unlikely feature of future naval warfare. 
This dissertation has also concluded that the intention doctrine does not reflect 
customary law. Israel’s enforcement action sixty-four nautical miles from the blockade 
zone was the subject of intense criticism. The criticism would be valid in any blockade 
enforcement action based upon the intention doctrine. The UK’s abandonment of the 
doctrine in its manual probably leaves only the U.S. and Israel as its proponents. 
Lastly, use of force in blockade enforcement operations may be based on a direct 
participation in hostilities or self-defence analysis. The Mavi Mamara case demonstrated 
circumstances in which a direct participation analysis offers the blockade commander 
broader lawful targeting parameters than self-defence. 
 
B. Maritime Zones 
 
Maritime zones, whereby belligerent States purport to control sea areas to the exclusion of 
shipping, are a relatively recent—and still controversial—development. There has been 
little commonality in terminology in States’ operational practice in this area. 
Commentators, national manuals and others refer to “security” zones, “special” zones, 
“exclusion” zones, “war” zones, “barred” zones and others. Whether these are intended to 
refer to the same concept is not always clear. To make matters worse, some national 
manuals refer to zones with significantly different characteristics within the same umbrella 
term. For example, the U.S. Naval War College’s Maritime Operational Zones handbook 
uses the phrase “warning area” to refer to a specified static sea area, but it also uses the 
term to refer to approach limitations around moving military assets.340 However they are 
styled, the practice of declaring zones has the potential for significant interference with the 
freedom of navigation of neutral shipping. Accordingly, they are as much a part of 
neutrality law as blockade and the right to exclude shipping from a specific area of naval 
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operations, considered later in this Part. This dissertation will consider zones under the 
following classifications: mobile zones (whether employed in peace or during an armed 
conflict), static law of naval warfare zones and static peacetime zones.341 
 
1. Mobile Zones or Defensive Bubbles 
 
Many States have employed defensive bubbles around military units to define approach 
limits for other vessels and aircraft, including neutral vessels and aircraft. The U.S. adopted 
a five nautical mile/two thousand feet defensive bubble around its units in the Persian Gulf 
during the last years of the Iran-Iraq War in the following terms: 
 
U.S. Naval Forces operating in international waters are taking defensive precautions against 
terrorists. All surface and subsurface ships are requested to avoid closing U.S. Naval Forces 
closer than 5 Nm [nautical miles] without previously identifying themselves. Ships that close 
within 5 Nm without making prior contact and/or whose intentions are unclear . . . may be 
held at risk by U.S. defense measures.342 
  
A U.S. Notice to Airmen of the same year was in similar terms, but included a 2,000 feet 
altitude limit. The UK declared a defensive bubble around the task group sent south to 
recapture the Falkland Islands in 1982.343 The German Commander’s Handbook declares it 
is the right and duty of a warship captain to defend his ship and crew, including by the 
“establishment of warning areas or declaration of security or defensive bubbles.”344  
States agree that there is no requirement of notification of the location of a mobile 
zone. If there were, it would entail the publication of the whereabouts of military units, 
information which States understandably often desire to withhold.345 Although not 
required, the U.S. and UK practice shows that the effectiveness of the bubble depends 
upon public declaration that units will operate under it. Defensive bubbles are not (or 
should not be) binary in nature: they declare neither that all traffic outside the bubble is 
                                                                                                                                               
341. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 115, 304. 
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safe from attack nor that all traffic which enters it may be attacked. Approach to, or entry 
in, a bubble should be considered as an operational consideration for the unit commander 
in assessing whether a detected contact (at whatever range) is hostile, friendly or neutral. 
Other considerations will include, inter alia, the contact’s speed, apparent characteristics, 
point of origin, “identify friend or foe” signature, if any, compliance with normal flight and 
shipping routes, known intelligence on enemy or neutral activity, other enemy activity in 
the area, and many others. There is plainly nothing in law, whether in peace or during 
armed conflict, which prohibits a commander from using a set range from his unit 
(presumably set in accordance with intelligence data on the likely threat and the capabilities 
of the unit’s weapon systems) as a consideration in assessing the threat posed by a vessel or 
aircraft. But the decision to establish fixed approach distances creates no duty on neutral 
shipping to remain outside of the declared bubble. The text of the U.S. notifications 
“requesting” other vessels and aircraft to remain clear of the defensive bubbles reflects this 
position. 
Two cases are routinely used to demonstrate the potential danger of overreliance on 
the defensive bubble device. The USS Stark was operating under the U.S. defensive bubble 
in the Persian Gulf in 1987 at the height of the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq. She was 
struck by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired by an Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter aircraft, which 
apparently erroneously believed the Stark to be an oil tanker.346 Even once the F-1 was in 
missile release range, Stark took no defensive measures and issued none of the standard 
warnings to the aircraft that it was approaching a U.S. Navy warship. If she had, the 
erroneous attack may well have been averted. This failure appears in part to have been 
because the F-1 was outside the defensive bubble and, therefore, considered to be non-
threatening. 
Less than a year later, the USS Vincennes was operating in the Straits of Hormuz and 
dealing with a threat from Iranian fast inshore attack craft. Concurrently, she became aware 
of an unidentified incoming air contact, which was, in fact, a civilian airliner, Iran Air Flight 
655. Key informational factors could have identified it as non-threatening: its course (a 
recognized flight path) and its point of origin (Bandar Abbas civil airport). The 
commanding officer considered these, but to him they had less weight because, unusually 
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for a civil airliner, the aircraft was 3–4 miles away from the centreline of the flight path, and 
because Bandar Abbas airport had also been used for military purposes, including the 
basing of strike aircraft which had launched from there within the previous twenty-four 
hours. Further, nearby was an Iranian P3 aircraft, which could have provided the contact 
with valuable targeting information. All these factors conspired to make the aircraft appear 
hostile. If the Vincennes was to stay out of missile range (and avoid the fate of the Stark), 
the commanding officer felt he needed to act immediately. He ordered that the aircraft be 
shot down, with the consequent loss of 290 civilian lives.347 
The facts indicate the defensive bubble clouded the judgment of the Stark command 
team which believed the approaching Iraqi fighter aircraft was not a threat until it entered 
the defensive bubble. It is too simplistic to say that the fateful decision to shoot down 
Flight 655 was taken solely because the aircraft was on course to enter the bubble—other 
factors appeared to support the decision to take immediate defensive action.348 The cases 
do show how overreliance on a defensive bubble can lead to opposite, but equally 
dangerous, assumptions: “it’s outside the bubble so can do me no harm” or “it’s on course 
to enter the bubble, it must intend me harm.” A defensive bubble is—and must be—but 
one of many operational considerations in determining how to respond to an approaching 
ship or aircraft. 
 
2. Static Law of Naval Warfare Zones 
 
No mention of zones is made in Hague XIII, the 1928 Havana Convention or any other 
treaties dealing with the law of naval warfare. The Harvard Draft Convention was specific 
in forbidding a belligerent from establishing “a barred zone or other area . . . in which it 
seeks to impose special prohibition, restriction or regulation upon the passage of neutral 
                                                                                                                                               
347. Iran Airbus Crash Tied to U.S. Errors: Mistakes Were in 'Fog of War,' Report Says of Fatal Gulf Incident, LOS 
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348. Although some of these factors were based on erroneous interpretation of data. For example, there 
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the suspicion that it was flying an attack profile. However, the aircraft was in fact ascending. See Admiral 
William M. Fogarty USN, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air 
Flight 655 on 3 July 1988, Chairman, Second Endorsement from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary 
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www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/other/172.pdf. POLITAKIS, supra note 233, at 108–19, 
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vessels.”349 The development of static law of naval warfare zones depends almost entirely 
on State practice during and since the world wars. Tucker claims the development of the 
practice of static zones was a product of belligerent desire to achieve a blockade, without 
having to comply with the attendant onerous legal requirements during the world wars.350 
The San Remo Manual commentary notes that by 1994 there was a considerable body 
of State practice of declaring zones and that many of these did not have blockade-like 
objectives.351 Zones are described in the San Remo Manual as an “exceptional measure,” 
subject to the principle of proportionality. 352 Due regard must be had to neutrals’ legitimate 
use of the sea. According to the Manual, “a belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties 
under international humanitarian law by establishing zones which might adversely affect 
the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.”353 It also provides that necessary safe 
passage must be provided where a zone significantly impedes access to neutral ports or 
coasts, or where normal navigation routes are affected and military requirements allow.354 
Static zones must be declared and notified.355 The Manual’s provisions provide that 
maritime zones must be proportionate in two respects. They must not have a 
disproportionate effect on enemy civilians (law of armed conflict proportionality) and they 
must not have a disproportionate effect on legitimate neutral use of the sea (neutrality 
proportionality). 
The use of zones is well documented in contemporary national manuals. The UK 
Manual, under the heading “Security zones” permits zones as a “defensive measure or to 
impose some limitation on the geographical extent of the area of the conflict.”356 It goes on 
to refer to the establishment of “maritime exclusion zones and total exclusion zones.”357 It 
is not clear whether these are intended to be construed as separate categories of zones, 
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examples of security zones, or whether the phrases are to be considered interchangeable.358 
It is submitted that the second construction is most likely because the UK Manual goes on, 
in wording identical to the San Remo Manual and not limited to maritime exclusion zones 
or total exclusion zones, to set out the conditions under which such zones will be lawful.359 
U.S. and German guidance reflects the San Remo Manual position.360 The Chinese Manual 
asserts that the declaration of a zone may not interfere with the vessels of neutral States, 
although acknowledges that many States have declared zones that do.361 In the case of the 
British Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland Islands in 1982, the Chinese 
Manual states that the declaration of the zone did not prevent the sinking of the ARA 
General Belgrano outside of the zone and observes that “this incident was not considered a 
violation of international law.”362 
Despite congruence between the San Remo Manual and national manuals, areas of 
uncertainty remain. The first is rather fundamental: for what purpose is it lawful to 
establish a zone? Several potential purposes present themselves: protection of a high value 
unit, denial of a sea area to the enemy, management of battlespace, protection of neutral 
shipping, focusing military resources in appropriate areas, limiting the geographical scope 
of an armed conflict and ruse of war. A logical answer is that a zone may be established for 
any purpose which would be legitimate under the law of armed conflict and which does 
not violate any other principle or rule. 
A second issue is whether zones are subject to the requirements of effectiveness and 
impartiality by analogy with the law of blockade. Good policy reasons suggest they are, or 
should be, required to be effective.363 Like a blockade, a maritime zone is capable of 
significant interference with neutral shipping, thus the problem of paper zones could be as 
pernicious to neutrals as paper blockades were before the Declaration of Paris in 1856. No 
such policy arguments support the view that every zone must be impartially enforced 
against all traffic. Indeed, for a zone not to have an intolerable effect on neutral shipping, it 
                                                                                                                                               
358. Id., ¶ 13.77. Another reason for the specific mention of “maritime” and “total” exclusion zones 
might be to reassert the lawfulness of the zones (by the same name) imposed by the UK during the Falklands 
War in 1982. 
359. Id., ¶ 13.78, repeating SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 106. 
360. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.9; ZONES HANDBOOK, supra note 340, at 4-8; GERMAN 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 305. 
361. CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 249. 
362. Id.. 
363. Heintschel von Heinegg, Armed Conflicts at Sea, supra note 266, at 549. 
 80 
 
 
might be entirely appropriate for it to target only enemy shipping, as did the British MEZ 
around the Falkland Islands.364 
The consequences of a neutral’s infraction of a declared zone are perhaps the principal 
reason for the persisting controversy surrounding zones. Entry into a declared zone by a 
neutral merchant vessel during the world wars often resulted in its being sunk on sight.365 
Commentators and national manuals are united in declaring the illegality of unrestricted 
warfare zones, or the complete suspension of the principle of distinction within a zone.366 
More recent State practice (in both declaring and responding to zones) reflects this view, as 
the British experience in the Falklands War demonstrates. While only the Soviet Union 
registered an official protest, the British TEZ was criticized on the ground that it seemed 
to affect a free fire zone.367 The words used in declaring the zone gave that impression: 
“any ship or aircraft . . . within this zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in 
London will be . . . regarded as hostile and will be liable to attack by the British forces.”368 
The critical response to that phraseology demonstrates the widespread view that the 
declaration of a zone is not grounds to abandon the principle of distinction, or otherwise 
modify the application of the law of armed conflict within the zone.369 On the 
commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the U.S. declared a maritime 
safety zone in the eastern Mediterranean Sea while conducting carrier and missile strike 
operations into Iraq. The penalty for infraction was visit and search by U.S. forces. The 
stated purpose of the zone was battlespace management, given the high intensity of 
offensive operations being conducted therein. It lasted only as long as strike operations 
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persisted.370 This operation represents a contemporary example of a lawful zone. It was 
proportionate and reasonable, and asserted no more control in its extent, duration and 
effect on neutral shipping than was necessary in order to conduct the relevant operation.  
The appropriate penalty for a neutral vessel in breach of a zone is a matter of 
conjecture. As far as the author is aware, no belligerent has sought to enforce a zone by 
capturing vessels in breach as prize. The UK never had to enforce its Falkland Islands TEZ 
in 1982 so the issue of the penalty never arose. Both belligerents in the Iran/Iraq War 
declared zones. Their mode of enforcement, however, was indiscriminate and widely 
condemned, adding further support, were it needed, for the position that attack is a 
disproportionate and unlawful penalty.371 Fenrick concluded:  
 
An attempt to appraise legal aspects of the use of exclusion zones in the Iran/Iraq conflict 
must take cognizance of the fact that neither belligerent appears to be paying particular heed to 
legal issues in determining their courses of action. . . . About Iranian conduct, one can quote J 
W Garner again concerning German war zones and simply observe, it was so flagrantly 
contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can be said in defence of it.372 
 
U.S. practice in 2003 suggests that simple diversion or visit and search is an appropriate 
way for belligerents to deal with zone infractions, without need to resort to capture. If 
zones are not enforced by capture, then prize proceedings will not result, again 
demonstrating that prize proceedings are an unlikely feature of future naval warfare. 
 
3. Static Peacetime Zones 
 
UNCLOS permits States to declare safety zones around artificial islands in the exclusive 
economic zone or above the continental shelf and around scientific research installations, 
even when on the high seas.373 Other static peacetime zones might be declared pursuant to 
the freedom of the high seas. For example, temporary warning zones might be created to 
facilitate weapons testing or military exercises.374 There is no obligation on neutral States to 
suspend their own uses of such zones during an armed conflict. If belligerent forces are 
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operating in neutral States’ exclusive economic zones, or in the vicinity of neutrals 
exercising their high seas freedoms in these ways, they will be obliged to have “due regard” 
for the neutral States’ activities.375  
The corollary of this is that neutral States must have due regard for belligerents’ 
legitimate uses of the high seas under the law of naval warfare. For example, it would not 
be acceptable for a neutral State to interfere in a belligerent’s right to establish and enforce 
a blockade by establishing an overlapping warning zone in order to conduct a military 
exercise. Finally, it should be noted that modern military manuals are clear that the 
declaration of a static control or exclusion zone might be a legitimate measure taken under 
the inherent right of self-defence in appropriate circumstances.376 
 
C. The Immediate Vicinity of Naval Operations 
 
The right of belligerents to exclude neutral shipping from the immediate vicinity of naval 
operations is recognized as a well-established rule in the commentary to the Helsinki 
Principles.377 It receives recognition in the San Remo Manual.378 NWP 1-14M and the UK 
Manual reflect the San Remo Manual position.379 The German Commander’s Handbook 
states that belligerents “are permitted to establish special restrictions for neutral maritime 
and air transport.”380 The Chinese Manual recognizes belligerent authority to exclude 
shipping from “naval battlefields.”381 Neutral vessels are obliged to obey orders from 
belligerents in the immediate area of naval operations; in these circumstances belligerents’ 
security interests outweigh the freedom of navigation of neutral shipping.382 Any neutral 
ship which disobeys belligerent orders is liable to capture or diversion. Where a neutral 
                                                                                                                                               
375. UNCLOS, supra note 32, arts. 59, 87(2). 
376. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.77.1; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 2.6.4; GERMAN 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 115. The CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 113, is less clear 
on the matter, but discusses other measures which may be taken in self-defence. 
377. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, cmt. at 505. The rule received only oblique reference in the 
Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 70, cmt. at 694–96. 
378. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 146(e). 
379. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.8; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.106. 
380. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 305. 
381. CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 248. 
382. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 146.6. 
83 
 
 
vessel’s disobedience or interference confers a positive advantage upon one belligerent, the 
circumstances might even render it a legitimate military objective at risk of attack.383 
There is seemingly no requirement that the immediate vicinity of naval operations be 
declared before the rule may be enforced. There is little guidance on the definition of 
immediate vicinity, but given the words used and the broad rights of control enjoyed by 
belligerents within, a narrow construction seems to be intended. Tucker was clear that the 
right was a transient one and only pertained to an area where naval hostilities were actually 
taking place or belligerent forces were operating.384 He concluded, consistent with a narrow 
construction, that the rule was not a “serious restriction upon neutral freedom of 
navigation on the high seas.”385 This view is consistent with the position of modern military 
manuals. 
Recent State practice also supports Tucker’s position. In 2011, NATO members and 
partner States launched air and missile strikes from the sea into Libya. These have been 
described as “battlespace shaping operations” for subsequent enforcement of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1973.386 As circumstances required, merchant shipping was 
ordered by radio transmissions to remain clear from sea areas where cruise missile launches 
were taking place. The orders remained in force only so long as strikes were carried out.387 
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PART FIVE: UNNEUTRAL SERVICE 
 
The phrase unneutral service was first coined by Sir Christopher Robinson, an English 
Admiralty court reporter in the 1800s.388 He used it to describe two unneutral acts which 
the English Prize Court had begun to treat more severely than mere carriage of 
contraband—the carriage of enemy troops and the carriage of enemy dispatches. 
Previously, international treaties and domestic prize courts had treated soldiers and 
dispatches merely as varieties of contraband. However, the jurisprudence of the English 
Prize Court during the Napoleonic Wars took a different approach, thereby influencing 
international law.389 Henceforth, unneutral service was characterized by closeness to the 
enemy, which was more culpable. In giving judgment in The Friendship (1807), Sir William 
Scott said, “It is the case of a vessel letting herself out in a distinct manner, under a 
contract with the enemy’s government . . . which cannot be considered to be permitted to 
neutral vessels. . . .”390 Accordingly, in the early 1800s, the English Prize Court penalized 
unneutral service not just by seizure of the offending items or persons carried, but also by 
condemnation of the vessel itself.391 The concept grew and grew. Writing in 1955, Tucker 
said that unneutral service “has come to signify little more than any service rendered by a 
neutral subject to a belligerent contrary to international law, excluding the acts of 
contraband carriage or blockade breach.”392 He then divided unneutral service into three 
categories: unneutral service which results in liability for treatment as an enemy warship; 
unneutral service which results in liability for treatment as an enemy merchant ship; and 
unneutral service which results in liability for seizure.393 This Part will proceed on the basis 
of Tucker’s classification, before assessing whether it still reflects the law. 
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A. Enemy Warship Unneutral Service  
 
The law of naval warfare allows enemy warships to be attacked on the basis of their status. 
Tucker said that neutral vessels which directly participate in the military operations of the 
belligerent, whether by entering into actual hostilities or by serving as an auxiliary, also 
render themselves liable to attack on sight.394 More recently, the San Remo Manual has 
stated, in language mirroring Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), that merchant ships may 
be attacked if, by their nature, location, purpose or use they make an effective contribution 
to the enemy’s military effort.395 Other contemporary manuals agree that neutral merchant 
vessels may be attacked when they participate in the enemy’s war effort.396 Conduct which 
renders a neutral merchant vessel liable to attack includes being incorporated into an 
enemy’s intelligence system, sailing under convoy of enemy warships, laying mines, 
minesweeping, cutting undersea cables, attacking friendly merchant ships and acting as an 
auxiliary.397 Acting as an auxiliary includes carrying troops or supplies for warships or task 
groups and would encompass, as an example, the merchant ships taken up from trade used 
by the UK during the Falklands conflict.398 
Before an offending neutral merchant vessel might be attacked, however, the 1936 
London Protocol seems to require that its passengers, crew and papers be placed in safety 
by providing:  
 
[E]xcept in the case of a persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active 
resistance to visit or search, a warship . . . may not sink or render incapable of navigation a 
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of 
safety.399 
 
                                                                                                                                               
394. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 319–20. Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, supra note 30, art. 
65, cmt. at 658 (It also provided that a neutral vessel which participated in hostilities or acted as an auxiliary 
could be treated as an enemy warship.). 
395. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 40. 
396. Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.1.2(4)(a)–(e); UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.47; NWP 
1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.5.2, 8.6.2.2; GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 273–74; 
CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 265. 
397. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, r. 67(b)–(f), ¶¶ 67.24–26. 
398. Id. 
399. 1936 London Protocol, supra note 366, art. 2. 
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National manuals specifically acknowledge the limitations imposed by the 1936 
London Protocol.400 The San Remo Manual and Helsinki Principles also make explicit 
reference to it in their commentaries.401 It seems unlikely, however, that these manuals are 
asserting that a neutral merchant ship which is, for example, attacking friendly merchant 
ships cannot be attacked unless Article 2 has first been satisfied. The general law of armed 
conflict would not place such an onerous burden upon belligerents. 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, Article 52(2), provides:  
 
[A]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, 
military objectives are limited to those which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
 
Article 52(2) reflects customary law that plainly applies at sea.402 Once the Article 52(2) 
test is satisfied, a proportionality assessment is required.403 This collateral damage estimate 
need not consider members of the passengers and crew of the vessel who are direct 
participants in hostilities.404 On the other hand, the London Protocol seems to provide that 
in respect of attacks on merchant ships not only is collateral damage forbidden, but that 
even passengers and crew who are direct participants must be removed to safety before a 
neutral vessel may be attacked.405 This would be an unjustifiable limitation on targeting 
discretion and surely cannot be intended. As one commentator has suggested, “there is no 
reason in either experience or logic why the London Protocol should be interpreted as 
protecting neutral merchant ships which are engaged in the same functional activities that 
result in lack of protection for an enemy merchant ship.”406 The German Commander’s 
Handbook shares this view, saying, “the provisions of the London Protocol are based on 
                                                                                                                                               
400. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.47.f; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.6.2.2; GERMAN 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 273; CHINESE MANUAL, supra note 25, at 258.  
401. SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 26, ¶ 60.10 (referring to the U.S. Navy manual, which was NWP 9, 
the predecessor to NWP 1-14M); Helsinki Principles, supra note 10, princ. 5.1.2(3)–(4), cmt. at 508. 
402. Despite the language in Article 49(3) of Additional Protocol I, supra note 175, stating that the 
Protocol’s provisions do not apply to pure law of naval warfare scenarios, the drafters of the San Remo 
Manual used exactly the text of the Protocol's Article 52(2) in framing rule 40. The same text appears in the 
UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.26. 
403. Additional Protocol I, supra note 175, art. 57. 
404. Id., art. 51(3). 
405. For a discussion of the concept of direct participation, see supra pp. 71-73. 
406. W. T. MALLINSON JR, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND 
LIMITED WARS 130 (1968) (Vol. 56, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
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the assumption that the vessels concerned are merchant vessels only performing their 
original civilian functions, i.e., not taking any part in the hostilities.”407 
Another provision which may now affect a belligerent’s response to a neutral merchant 
vessel committing enemy warship unneutral service is the prohibition on the use of force 
found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. An attack on a neutral-flagged merchant vessel 
may amount to a use of force against the neutral flag State and, therefore, be forbidden by 
Article 2(4). A small group of the drafters of the San Remo Manual thought as much, 
opining that in all cases an attack on a neutral merchant vessel required separate 
justification as self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.408 The majority, however, 
rejected that position, saying that the U.N. Charter had no role to play in determining the 
legality of belligerents’ conduct during an armed conflict.409 
The position of the minority deserves further scrutiny. During the Iran-Iraq War, the 
U.S. relied upon self-defence following alleged Iranian attacks on its flagged vessels, 
including merchant vessels. The MV Sea Isle City was a merchant oil tanker struck by a 
missile on October 16, 1987.410 The MV Bridgeton, another merchant vessel, struck a mine 
(alleged by the U.S. to be Iranian) in the central Arabian Gulf. The U.S. claimed that Iran 
was using two oil platforms to coordinate attacks on neutral merchant shipping, and, 
having cleared them of personnel, destroyed them. The U.S. subsequently reported these 
acts to the U.N. Security Council as acts of self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter. Here the U.S. was in the position of a neutral State vis-à-vis belligerent Iran. It 
plainly considered that the U.N. Charter governed its relations with the belligerent States 
and that the alleged attacks on each vessel amounted to uses of force. Indeed, the U.S. 
considered the attacks were not only uses of force, but armed attacks justifying a forcible 
response under Article 51. This position tends to support the approach of the minority at 
San Remo. However, in the resulting Oil Platforms litigation, the I.C.J. rejected the U.S. 
claim to have been acting in self-defence on a number of bases, observing in the process 
                                                                                                                                               
407. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 273. 
408. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 67.3. 
409. Id. 
410. Sea Isle City was a Kuwaiti oil tanker reflagged to the United States shortly prior to the attack. See 
further Scott Davidson, United States Protection of Reflagged Kuwaiti Vessels in the Gulf War: The Legal Implications, 4 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ESTUARINE AND COASTAL LAW 173 (1988). 
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that it doubted an attack on a merchant vessel could ever amount to an armed attack on 
the vessel’s flag State.411 The I.C.J.’s position tends to support the San Remo majority. 
The U.S.’s own manual, NWP 1-14M, also supports the position of the majority that 
neutral merchant vessels which are making an effective contribution to a belligerent’s war 
effort may be attacked without separate justification under Article 51.412 The U.S. plainly 
saw no contradiction between this provision in NWP 1-14M and the action it took against 
Iran. The U.S. doctrine in NWP 1-14M and its experience during the Tanker War suggests 
that States have a discretion as to whether they view an attack on one of their merchant 
ships as a use of force or an armed attack against them. Whether they do or not will 
depend on the circumstances. For example, if the Sea Isle City, instead of being an oil tanker 
engaged in commercial activity, was a passenger ship contracted to the Iraqi government 
and acting as a troop carrier (even though still under a U.S. flag), it is unlikely the U.S. 
would have claimed a right to act in self-defence if Iran attacked it. 
 
B. Enemy Merchant Ship Unneutral Service 
 
According to Tucker, operating under the direct control of a belligerent government, but 
performing service short of participation in operations or acting as an auxiliary, means a 
neutral vessel acquires enemy character and may be treated in the same way as an enemy 
merchant ship. He gives being chartered to a belligerent government to make commercial 
voyages on its behalf as an example.413 Unlike enemy warship unneutral service, this 
behaviour does not justify attack under the law of armed conflict. Therefore, for targeting 
purposes, distinguishing between enemy and neutral merchant vessels is largely 
meaningless. What matters in the targeting context is whether the merchant vessel may be 
said to be a legitimate military objective, not whether it is enemy or neutral flagged.414 
Outside of targeting, the distinction between the two once did have significance. 
Enemy merchant vessels may be subject to capture and condemnation.415 Neutral vessels 
must perform some offence before they may be captured and condemned as a prize, e.g., 
                                                                                                                                               
411. Oil Platforms, supra note 91, ¶ 64. 
412. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.5.2, 8.6.2.2. 
413. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 322. 
414. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶¶ 67.6–67.10. 
415. Id., r. 135; UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.99; NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.6.2.1. 
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carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, etc. Furthermore, once capture has been 
affected, belligerents traditionally enjoyed broad discretion to destroy enemy merchant 
vessels, whereas discretion to destroy neutral prizes was strictly limited.416 But that position 
seems to have changed. The San Remo Manual considers that a merchant ship of any 
variety may only be destroyed when (1) military circumstances preclude taking the vessel as 
a prize and (2) there can be compliance with the 1936 London Protocol requirement 
concerning the safety of the ship’s crew, passengers and papers. It makes no distinction 
between enemy and neutral merchant vessels. The U.S. Manual and German Commander’s 
Handbook reflect the same position.417  
The UK Manual still draws a distinction between captured enemy and neutral merchant 
vessels. In the case of enemy merchant vessels, the UK Manual provisions are the same as 
those in the San Remo Manual.418 With respect to neutral merchant vessels, however, the 
UK maintains a position it has held since the nineteenth century: that destruction of a 
neutral prize is never permitted. Neutral prizes which are not taken for adjudication must 
be released, on the UK view. The earliest authority for this position is The Felicity (1819).419 
In that case, Sir William Scott set out the duties of a commander who is not in a position to 
take a ship as a prize due to military circumstances. In the case of an enemy ship, Scott 
said, “Under this collision of duties nothing was left but to destroy her, for they could not . 
. . permit the enemy’s property to sail away unmolested. If impossible to bring it in, their 
next duty is to destroy enemy’s property.”420 In respect of a neutral ship, he went on:  
 
[T]he act of destruction cannot be justified to the neutral owner, by the importance of such an 
act to the public service of the captor’s own state; to the neutral it can only be justified, under 
any such circumstances, by a full restitution in value. These are rules so clear in principle and 
established in practice that they require neither reasoning nor precedent to illustrate or support 
them.421  
 
                                                                                                                                               
416. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 349–54. 
417. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 8.6.2.2 (enemy merchant vessels), ¶ 7.10.1 (neutral merchant vessels). 
NWP 1-14M does not specifically address the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel after capture, but does 
make explicit reference to the 1936 London Protocol in relation to the attack of enemy merchant vessels 
under the heading “Destruction.” It may thus be safely inferred that the U.S. position reflects the San Remo 
position. The GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 288, is much clearer in favouring the 
San Remo position. The Chinese Manual does not address this issue. 
418. UK MANUAL, supra note 22, ¶ 13.103. See also Haines, supra note 131, at 98. 
419. 2 Dods. 381. 
420. Id. at 386. 
421. Id. 
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The rule established in The Felicity has remained the British view since that case was 
decided.422 
For States, such as the U.S. and Germany, which recognize no difference in the lawful 
treatment of neutral and enemy prizes after capture, this type of unneutral service may be 
safely assimilated into Tucker’s third category of “unneutral service which results in liability 
for seizure,” discussed presently. For the UK, the distinction between Tucker’s second and 
third category of unneutral service is illusory in all but the most exceptional of 
circumstances. It has already been observed that captures in prize are an unlikely feature of 
future naval warfare. Circumstances where there may be a need to destroy or release a prize 
after capture are therefore extremely unlikely. It is safe to conclude that Tucker’s “enemy 
merchant ship” category of unneutral service serves no purpose in the modern law. 
 
C. Unneutral Service Which Results in Liability to Seizure 
 
Tucker concluded that the carrying of certain enemy persons or dispatches would result in 
liability to seizure, because it “may be undertaken in much the same manner as the carriage 
of contraband, that is without implying a direct control by—or even a close relationship 
with—the belligerent.”423 It is interesting that Tucker adopts this position, as it was 
precisely the proximity to the belligerent that led the English Prize Court to distinguish 
these two acts from general contraband carriage. If he is right, it may no longer make sense 
to continue to classify carriage of enemy persons and dispatches as distinct from carriage of 
contraband. This is especially true if, as is widely held, serious examples of carriage of 
contraband may result in condemnation of the vessel in addition to condemnation of the 
cargo. Nonetheless the substance of the traditional rules will be considered before this 
question will be assessed. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
422. The history of the British position is set out in the Harvard Draft Convention with Commentary, 
supra note 30, cmt. at 566–68. 
423. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 324. 
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1. Carriage of Enemy Persons 
 
The 1802 English prize case of The Carolina424 was the first in which transportation of 
members of the armed forces of a belligerent was established as a species of unneutral 
service. The Carolina was a Swedish-flagged vessel employed as a French troop transport 
between French colonies and Alexandria, Egypt during the Napoleonic Wars. On her last 
voyage before capture, she had carried one hundred and fifty French dragoons to 
Alexandria. During the British campaign for Alexandria, the British forces permitted all 
neutral ships to leave the port, but the Carolina did not sail until four days later, claiming 
that the French commander would not permit her to do so. She was captured by the 
British. During prize proceedings, it was argued on the vessel owner’s behalf that (a) her 
capture was unlawful because she was not in delicto at the time of capture and (b) that she 
was forced into the action by French duress. Sir William Scott accepted neither argument. 
As to the first he found as a matter of fact that the vessel was still under contract to the 
French and, therefore, still in delicto, even though the offending troop carriage had been 
completed.425 As to the second he found that a belligerent cannot entertain claims of duress 
by the other belligerent. The proper mode of redress for such oppressive conduct lay 
against the belligerent government that had applied the duress and caused the vessel 
owner’s loss.426 
The facts of The Carolina beg the question of when carriage of enemy persons becomes 
acting as an auxiliary justifying not just capture, but attack as a legitimate military objective. 
This will be a question of fact in each circumstance, based on application of the criteria in 
Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2). If the Carolina had been caught in the act by British 
forces, she would doubtless have been a lawful target under the law of armed conflict and 
liable to attack on sight. 
A contentious issue in the negotiations leading to the 1909 Declaration of London was 
whether belligerents enjoyed the right to remove enemy persons from a neutral vessel 
                                                                                                                                               
424. 4 C. Rob. 256. 
425. Id. at 261. Other commentators (e.g., Hill, supra note 388, at 64) have cited the case as authority for 
the position that a vessel which commits unneutral service need not be in delicto in order to be subject to 
capture, but given Sir William Scott’s finding of fact, the case is not authority for that position. 
426. Id. at 260. See also The Friendship, supra note 390; The Orozembo (1807) 6 C. Rob. 430. 
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where there are no independent grounds to capture the vessel.427 In the end, the 
Declaration did provide for such a right, even in the face of stiff U.S. disapproval.428 It 
extended only to members of the enemy armed forces. Tucker concluded that “the practice 
of states may be regarded as having sanctioned this measure.”429 However, despite the 
terms of the Declaration of London, he was not able to state the boundaries of the rule. 
Was it limited to members of the enemy armed forces, or did it include, for example, males 
of military age, or even “any person of value to an enemy’s war effort—particularly 
scientists”?430 
One case which might support a broad interpretation of the rule involved the Japanese 
passenger steamship Asama Maru in 1940 (when Japan was still neutral in the Second 
World War). A Royal Navy destroyer visited and searched the vessel on the high seas, but 
only thirty-five nautical miles off the coast of Japan. The destroyer’s commanding officer 
ordered the removal of twenty-one of fifty German passengers on board. The Japanese 
protested the proximity of the visit to the Japanese coast and claimed that international law 
only permitted the capture of members of the armed forces. The British government 
justified the capture on the basis that “assuming that a right to remove enemy nationals 
from neutral ships exists at all (and this is not disputed by the Imperial Japanese 
Government), it must include persons returning to their own country for the purpose of 
fulfilling the obligation of military service which is imposed upon them by law.”431 The 
Japanese response stated that the British had confused the right to detain persons having 
lawfully captured the vessel as a prize with the more specific right contained in the 
Declaration of London. A compromise was eventually reached whereby the UK returned 
nine of the twenty-one passengers to Japan as unsuited for military service, and the 
Japanese government having assured the British government that passage in Japanese-
flagged vessels would henceforth be refused to belligerent military personnel or persons 
                                                                                                                                               
427. There would be no grounds for capture, for example, where the enemy individual had privately paid 
for his passage and was traveling in his private capacity, an exception contemplated by Sir William Scott in 
The Friendship (1807), supra note 390. 
428. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 47; Scott, supra note 161, at 526. 
429. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 328, 328 n.16. 
430. Id. at 329, 329 nn.18–19. 
431. Letter from Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador to Japan, to the Japanese Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (Jan. 27, 1940), extract reprinted in Herbert W. Briggs, Removal of Enemy Persons from Neutral 
Vessels on the High Seas, 34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 251 (1940). The position 
adopted by the British ambassador is almost exactly that taken in Article 62 of the Harvard Draft 
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suspected of so being.432 A contemporary U.S. commentator concluded that the British had 
acted in excess of the law and that the right of seizure of belligerent nationals from a 
neutral vessel was only lawful in the case of military personnel. He cited the U.S. 
government’s position during the First World War in support of his view.433 
Positions have shifted somewhat in the intervening years. The contemporary UK 
Manual does not assert a belligerent right to capture enemy personnel of any sort in neutral 
shipping. Neither do the San Remo Manual or the Helsinki Principles. The German 
Manual seems only to contemplate capture of enemy personnel in a neutral merchant 
vessel after it has been captured as a prize.434 In stark contrast to the U.S. position up to 
1940, the contemporary U.S. Manual is alone among the manuals surveyed in asserting the 
rule as follows: 
 
Enemy nationals found on board neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft as passengers who 
are actually embodied in the military forces of the enemy, who are en route to serve in the 
enemy’s armed forces, who are employed in the public service of the enemy, or who may be 
engaged in or suspected of service in the interests of the enemy may be made prisoners of war . 
. . whether or not there is reason for [the vessel or aircraft’s] capture as a neutral prize.435  
 
No authority is cited in support of this position in the U.S. Manual, nor in the most recent 
annotated supplement.436 It is unlikely that the U.S. position reflects contemporary 
customary law. 
 
2. Carriage of Dispatches for the Enemy 
 
The Constitution (1802)437 was the first case to apply principles of unneutral service to the 
carriage of enemy dispatches. Subsequently in The Atalanta (1808),438 Sir William Scott 
found that knowledge (whether real or construed in cases where a lack of due diligence is 
                                                                                                                                               
432. Id. at 253. 
433. Id. at 255–58. 
434. GERMAN COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶¶ 289–90. The Chinese Manual does not 
address this issue. 
435. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.10.2. 
436. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S. Naval War College International 
Law Studies). 
437. 6 C. Rob. 455. 
438. Id. at 440. 
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displayed) is required before the court will order condemnation of the vessel.439 While 
carriage of dispatches for an enemy might have been of potentially catastrophic effect on 
the wronged belligerent in 1808, Tucker notes that by 1955 due to technological 
developments this was no longer the case.440 If true in 1955, it is a fortiori the case now and 
it may safely be concluded that the old carriage of dispatches rule has fallen into desuetude. 
Indeed, even by 1909 the Declaration of London preferred the term “transmission of 
information in the interest of an enemy,”441 and it is this phrase which is employed in the 
U.S. Manual as a grounds justifying capture of a neutral merchant vessel.442 
Tucker rightly concluded that fitting new forms of communication into a legal 
framework designed to regulate quite different acts was a misleading endeavour.443 If a 
neutral merchant vessel transmitted information to the enemy by radio or other 
instantaneous form of communication, the effect on the wronged belligerent might be 
immediate and disastrous, and sufficient to render that vessel a lawful object of attack. An 
example of this occurred during the Falklands conflict in 1982. The Argentine-flagged 
fishing trawler Narwal repeatedly reported the position of UK forces to Argentinian 
authorities and was accordingly attacked and disabled by British forces on May 9. It is 
irrelevant that the Narwal was Argentinian- vice neutral-flagged: what matters is that she 
was by her use making an effective contribution to military action and that her destruction, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offered a definitive military advantage.444 
 
D. Unneutral Service: Concluding Remarks  
 
Tucker’s three categories of unneutral service require substantial revision. Beginning with 
the last seizure category, the old carriage of dispatches rule has fallen into desuetude. 
Carriage of enemy troops still amounts to grounds for capture and might lawfully be 
subject to punitive prize measures, but no more so than serious cases of carriage of 
                                                                                                                                               
439. Id. at 459. 
440. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 330 (although he concluded that the customary rules in respect of 
dispatches still had force). 
441. Declaration of London, supra note 151, art. 45(1). 
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443. TUCKER, supra note 46, at 331. 
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contraband. The policy reasons for the English court’s innovation in the early 1800s no 
longer pertain and carriage of enemy troops may, once again, be viewed as a species of 
contraband carriage. An exception to this is where carriage of enemy troops is of sufficient 
consequence to render the vessel treatable as an enemy auxiliary, in which case she may be 
attacked on sight. Tucker’s enemy warship unneutral service should instead be labelled 
“unneutral service resulting in liability to attack.” 
Accordingly, the law now recognizes two categories of unneutral service: first, that 
resulting in liability to attack and, second, that resulting in liability to seizure. This way, the 
law can accommodate emerging ways of committing unneutral acts. For example, Walker 
has suggested that Internet messages or hacks which contribute to enemy warfighting 
efforts may be equated with neutral shipping which commit unneutral acts.445 Heintschel 
von Heinegg has argued that for a neutral knowingly to allow the transmission of a 
belligerent cyber attack through its cyber infrastructure would be in breach of its neutrality 
obligations.446 Were either of these acts committed by a neutral vessel at sea, this unneutral 
service would surely now be grounds for capture (or even attack). The criteria of 
knowledge and culpability which characterized the traditional law should ensure that 
unneutral service will only be grounds for intercepting (or attacking) neutrals who have 
accepted this risk. In that way, the law of unneutral service is not the overbearing collection 
of belligerent rights to interfere with neutrals that Tucker worried it might become, but it is 
flexible enough to accommodate new ways for neutrals to infringe their impartiality 
obligations. 
Parts Three and Four concluded that simple diversions might be sanction enough 
against neutral vessels carrying contraband or attempting to breach a belligerent controlled 
area, such as a blockaded coast or maritime zone. However, unneutral service contemplates 
acts which might be committed by a neutral vessel without transiting anywhere. Carrying 
out Internet hacks or transmitting a cyber attack might just as easily be carried out at 
anchor as underway. Accordingly, ordering a diversion or course change might be 
insufficient to remedy the unneutral act being committed. Unneutral service might 
                                                                                                                                               
445. George K. Walker, Neutrality and Information Warfare, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 239 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval 
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therefore be the only grounds where proper enforcement still depends upon the ability to 
capture the offending vessel. Historically, all captures required judgment in prize; however, 
it has already been shown that prize proceedings can be avoided by simple repatriation 
after capture. Even where capture is required for effective enforcement, this does nothing 
to increase the likelihood of the use of prize proceedings in future conflicts. 
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PART SIX: MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
Neutral merchant shipping is inviolable by belligerents except in six situations. These are 
when they are carrying contraband, engaging in a forbidden trade, breaching a blockade, 
intruding in a declared maritime zone, transgressing the vicinity of ongoing naval 
operations and giving unneutral service to the enemy. When any of the six circumstances 
pertain, three means of enforcement against neutral shipping are available to belligerents: 
visit and search, diversion and capture. Each will be examined in turn. 
 
A. Visit and Search 
 
Some have questioned whether visit and search will remain an important mode of 
enforcement against neutral shipping in time of armed conflict.447 It is nonetheless 
preserved by modern military manuals and was relied upon as a belligerent right by Egypt 
from 1948–79, India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and Iran and Iraq from 1980–88. 
Coalition forces in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars employed visit and search, as did NATO 
forces in operations in Libya in 2011. These conflicts and operations serve to demonstrate 
the persisting operational utility of visit and search, even if in some cases its legal basis was 
Security Council authorization rather than the law of armed conflict.  
Belligerents may carry out visit and search operations on the high seas and in their 
own, and their enemy’s, internal waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. 
While nothing in UNCLOS forbids belligerents from conducting visit and search 
operations in neutral States’ exclusive economic zones and above their continental shelves, 
they may not carry out such operations in neutral internal waters or territorial seas.448 In 
certain sea areas, belligerents must have due regard to the rights of neutral States and 
others.449 As Walker has noted: 
 
Although coastal States have rights in the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone . . . and 
the continental shelf, these zones’ waters remain subject to high seas freedoms of navigation 
                                                                                                                                               
447. See, e.g., Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture: Part I, supra note 20. 
448. Hague XIII, supra note 7, art. 2. 
449. Some rights under UNCLOS are enjoyed not solely by States, but by, inter alia, “ships and aircraft” 
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and overflight as do waters above the [International Sea Bed Area, or “Area”], i.e., the deep 
seabed the LOS Convention reserves as humankind’s common heritage. Visit and search 
operations in these areas, and on [the] high seas . . ., are subject to a requirement that 
belligerents observe due regard for neutral States’ rights, whether that be high seas rights, 
neutrals’ rights in these zones, or humankind’s rights in the Area.450 
 
He goes on to say that even in the belligerents’ territorial seas, neutral States enjoy the right 
of innocent passage, and that belligerents must pay due regard to that right, unless innocent 
passage has been lawfully suspended.451 Walker’s position is undoubtedly correct.452 
Under the law of armed conflict, the UK and San Remo manuals provide that a neutral 
vessel may be visited and searched where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
vessel is subject to capture.453 This reasonable grounds threshold is not reflected in the 
same terms anywhere else. The Helsinki Principles provide for different thresholds 
depending on whether the object vessel is suspected of carrying contraband or breaching a 
blockade. In respect of the former, Principle 5.2.1 states “belligerent warships have a right 
to visit and search vis-à-vis neutral commercial ships in order to ascertain the character and 
destination of their cargo.”454 On the other hand, Principle 5.2.10 provides, “Neutral 
vessels believed on reasonable and probable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be 
stopped and captured.”455 The formulation of the Helsinki Principles reflects the plain fact 
that there is no need to visit and search a vessel to determine whether or not it is in breach 
of blockade—the belligerent is entitled to capture the vessel as soon as there is reasonable 
suspicion of breach. But reasonable suspicion is still required. No such threshold is used in 
the Principles in respect of the right of visit and search in the context of contraband. It can 
only be presumed that the difference is intentional, but regrettably there is no explanation 
to confirm this in the Principles’ commentary. 
The Declaration of London, Havana Convention and the Harvard Draft Convention 
placed no threshold criterion on the belligerent right of visit and search.456 In the 
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commentary to the Harvard Draft Convention, the drafters went as far as to say, “[Article 
49] states an unquestioned rule of international law and is not deemed to require any 
explanatory discussion.”457 The reasonable grounds formulation is not used in the German 
Commander’s Handbook, the Chinese Manual or NWP 1-14M.458 Neither do these 
manuals suggest an alternative limiting threshold. The implication is that the right of visit 
and search may be exercised entirely at the belligerent State’s discretion. Nonetheless, 
scholars have suggested that reasonable suspicion has long been a de facto prerequisite for 
visit and search of a neutral vessel.459 For instance, belligerents will always wish to make 
best use of their military resources, and it makes sense to focus visit and search operations 
where there is the greatest suspicion of unneutral behaviour. 
Whether the law imposes a threshold requirement for visit and search is, therefore, 
uncertain. Practically, it probably does not matter. The doctrine of continuous voyage and 
the intention doctrine broaden the scope of vessels which might reasonably be suspected 
of unneutral conduct justifying capture. Continuous voyage renders it reasonable to suspect 
even vessels destined for neutral ports of contraband carriage. This author doubts that the 
intention doctrine is reflected in contemporary customary law but, if it is, it widens the 
scope of reasonable suspicion of breach of blockade to include vessels far from the 
blockaded coast.460 The threshold of reasonable suspicion is so easily overcome in practice 
that it cannot amount to a substantial limitation on the exercise of visit and search. For this 
reason, Tucker described this debate as “bordering on sophistry.”461 
Another issue, in the context of visit and search, is whether the law exempts neutral 
vessels under neutral convoy from belligerent visit and search. Historically, it did not. In 
The Maria (1799),462 Sir William Scott punitively confiscated cargo and vessels when the 
neutral Swedish merchant vessels under the convoy of a Swedish warship forcibly resisted 
visit and search by a British warship. He recognized no exception from the regime of visit 
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and search for vessels under neutral convoy. He reasoned: “[T]he right of visiting and 
searching merchant-ships upon the high seas . . . is an incontestable right of the lawfully 
commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. . . . [I]t cannot legally be maintained that [a 
neutral Sovereign] is authorized by law to obstruct the exercise of that right . . . .”463  
On the other hand, the San Remo Manual states that a neutral merchant vessel under 
neutral convoy is exempt from the exercise of the belligerent’s right of visit and search if it 
satisfies the following criteria: 
 
a) it is bound for a neutral port; 
b) it is under convoy of an accompanying neutral warship of the same nationality or a neutral 
warship of a State with which the flag State of the merchant vessel has concluded an agreement 
providing for such convoy; 
c) the flag State of the neutral warship warrants that the neutral merchant vessel is not 
carrying contraband or otherwise engaged in activities inconsistent with its neutral status; and 
d) the commander of the neutral warship provides, if requested by the commander of an 
intercepting belligerent warship or military aircraft, all information as to the character of the 
merchant vessel and its cargo as could otherwise be obtained by visit and search.464 
 
The rule, in these terms, is also contained in military manuals.465  
Recent State practice is broadly supportive. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran 
had stopped, searched and, in some cases, attacked Kuwaiti tankers on the grounds that 
they were exporting oil from Iraq via Kuwaiti ports and helping to fund Iraq’s war effort. 
The legal basis for this activity is dubious. It has already been observed that a blockade is 
the only lawful grounds for interfering with enemy exports. Iran did not declare a formal 
blockade against Iraq and even if it had this would afford no justification for interfering 
with exports from neighbouring, neutral, Kuwait. Even if Kuwait was complicit in 
exporting Iraqi oil, this does not appear to constitute a breach of its broader neutral duties 
of impartiality or abstention.466 In 1987, the U.S. responded to a request from the Kuwaiti 
government and re-flagged several Kuwaiti tankers to its own flag and placed them under 
the protection of its warships to safeguard them against Iranian interference. The U.S. 
declared that its ships would not be carrying oil from Iraq and that neither party would 
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have any basis for taking hostile actions against U.S. naval ships or the vessels they were 
protecting.467 Iran did not attempt to board the re-flagged and convoyed vessels.468 
However, it might have been that Iran was motivated by a desire not to provoke the U.S. 
rather than any concern that it was legally bound to afford the re-flagged vessels any special 
protection.469 
Reaction from other States similarly supports the view that vessels under neutral 
convoy were exempt from visit and search. At the time, the UK described its warships in 
the Persian Gulf as escorting rather than convoying its merchant vessels, perhaps reflecting 
a persisting view that a neutral convoy provided no protection from visit and search.470 
Since then, however, the UK has adopted the San Remo position in its 2004 manual.471 
France used a warship to protect a French-flagged merchant vessel (the Ville d’Angers) from 
being visited and searched by an Iranian warship, implying that France held the view that 
merchant vessels under the protection of a neutral warship were immune from visit and 
search.472  
Some criticized the Kuwaiti re-flagging on the grounds that the re-flagged vessels did 
not enjoy a genuine link to the new flag State, although without doubting the broader 
principle that a neutral convoy provided protection from visit and search.473 UNCLOS 
imposes substantial duties on flag States and requires a genuine link between vessel and 
State.474 Third States (including the belligerents) would not be compelled to recognize the 
flag-shift if the link to the new flag State was not genuine.475 The U.S., a non-party to 
UNCLOS, accepted at the time that the genuine link requirement was an obligation under 
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customary law and believed that U.S. ownership, manning, safety and inspection 
requirements met the requirement.476 
The San Remo Manual formulation of the rule avoids the genuine link issue because it 
does not require re-flagging for a merchant vessel of one neutral State to be convoyed by a 
warship of another neutral State.477 An agreement between the neutral States to allow the 
convoy is sufficient. As long as that agreement is robust enough to allow the commander 
of an escorting warship to certify with certainty the character and cargo of the vessels 
protected, then the belligerent is obliged to rely upon the convoy commander’s 
undertaking.478 An agreement under the San Remo Manual rule would be sufficient to 
satisfy not just the law, but also the political message that the re-flagging was designed to 
convey to Iran: attack on or interference with the vessels would be construed as an attack 
on, or interference with the rights of, the U.S.479 The broad acceptance of the San Remo 
Manual’s position both in national manuals and State practice suggests the exemption from 
visit and search of vessels under neutral convoy reflects customary law. 
  
B. Diversion 
 
A belligerent might wish to divert a neutral merchant vessel from its course for two 
purposes. First, diversion might be a sanction in itself to prevent the neutral vessel from 
committing some unneutral act, for example, breaching a blockade. This might be styled 
diversion simpliciter. Second, it might be ordered so that visit and search might be carried 
out in the safety of a belligerent’s port.  
As to diversion simpliciter, the San Remo Manual states, “As an alternative to visit and 
search, a neutral merchant vessel may, with its consent, be diverted from its declared 
destination.”480 The Manual’s drafters considered this a novel rule and a new belligerent 
right. However, they believed that it was in the interests of neutrals and belligerents that 
the right be provided. The Manual’s explanation observed: “There are situations in which it 
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will suffice to keep merchant vessels out of certain areas instead of diverting them . . . for 
the purpose of visit and search.”481 Such situations might include preventing a neutral 
merchant vessel from breaching a blockade, infringing a declared maritime zone or 
transgressing the immediate vicinity of naval operations. The rule eliminates the need for a 
time-consuming and potentially hazardous visit and search operation. The UK Manual also 
adopts this position.482 Neither NWP 1-14M nor the Chinese Manual specifically refer to a 
right to divert neutral shipping as an alternative to visit and search. The German 
Commander’s Handbook authorizes the “giving of course instructions” to neutral 
merchant vessels where there is an “adequate probability of seizure,” but does not require 
the vessel’s consent.483 
The San Remo and British view that diversion simpliciter can occur only with the 
consent of the neutral master is puzzling and, in the view of this author, wrong. The San 
Remo and UK manuals suggest that if the neutral master does not consent, then the 
intercepting warship may visit and search the vessel, divert it for visit and search, or let it 
proceed.484 It seems odd that the sanction with lesser effect (diversion) requires consent, 
whereas the more onerous ones do not. Furthermore, one might question whether consent 
which is enforced by the threat of a more serious sanction is properly characterized as 
consent. Since the rule is a novel one, it is unlikely that any iterations of it yet reflect 
customary law. However, in terms of lex ferenda, the position of the German Commander’s 
Handbook is to be preferred. 
Diversion to facilitate visit and search was heavily employed during the First and 
Second World Wars. Visit and search had become more difficult for a number of reasons: 
the increase in size of merchant vessels, neutral shippers’ ability to hide contraband items 
among other cargo and the risk of submarine attack borne by a stationary warship 
undertaking visit and search. The Allied Powers began to divert neutral merchant ships to 
safe sea areas or, better, a home port where visit and search might be carried out in greater 
detail and in greater safety. The British found this had other benefits. Neutral cargo 
brought into the domestic jurisdiction in this way found itself subject to British domestic 
licensing, customs and fiscal law. Even if cargo was not condemned as contraband, these 
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other domestic restrictions could also prove effective in limiting commerce with the 
enemy.485 Widespread use of diversion, even if ostensibly only for the purpose of the safe 
conduct of visit and search, significantly reduced the number of cases resulting in capture 
and prize proceedings. It is another example of a development which contributes to the 
demise of the prize court. 
The difficulties encountered in the world wars in conducting visit and search at sea still 
pertain. It is widely accepted among commentators that the right to divert a neutral 
merchant vessel in order to conduct visit and search persists.486 The right is included in the 
San Remo Manual in circumstances when “visit and search at sea is impossible or 
unsafe.”487 The Manual’s explanation is clear that this sort of diversion is a compulsory 
order which a neutral merchant vessel is compelled to obey, a point which only serves to 
underline the incongruity of the Manual’s insistence that diversion for its own sake may be 
done only with the neutral vessel’s consent.488  
Tucker was persuaded that the practice of diversion for visit and search purposes had 
survived into post-Second World War law, but wondered whether, as a matter of lex ferenda, 
it ought to have.489 His concern was that diversion could be ordered as soon as there was 
justification for visit and search; since there was a very low threshold, if any, for visit and 
search, it gave belligerents authority to divert virtually any neutral merchant ship to one of 
its ports. Previously, belligerent warships’ boarding parties would have to show sufficient 
evidence to justify seizure, and then formally take the vessel as prize before sending it off 
to a home port for prize proceedings—a significantly higher evidentiary threshold. 
Diversion could be particularly pernicious to neutral traders, especially as it renders their 
cargo subject to the domestic jurisdiction of the diverting State. The English Prize Court 
has ruled, consistent with the UK Manual’s position on visit and search, that a reasonable 
suspicion of some unneutral behaviour is required before diversion.490 Given the low 
threshold for legitimate visit and search, this affords scant comfort to neutral traders. 
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The broad acceptance of diversion for visit and search has the potential for significant 
detriment to neutrals. One way in which the rule’s potential for harm might be reduced 
would be to recognize a higher threshold for visit and search in the first place—a restrictive 
interpretation of the reasonable suspicion threshold, for example. This seems an unlikely 
development. 
 
C. Capture 
 
Neutral merchant vessels are subject to capture if they carry contraband, refuse or actively 
resist visit and search, perform unneutral service or breach a blockade.491 It is not clear 
whether the law allows for the capture of neutral vessels which infringe a declared maritime 
zone. It was concluded above that a maritime zone was a lawful basis for belligerent 
interference in neutral freedom of navigation, but that the law was not settled as to the 
appropriate enforcement measure.492 In many cases, an order to change course or leave the 
restricted area will satisfy the belligerent’s need. Logically, though, capture should be an 
available penalty where simple diversion is not sufficient or not obeyed. 
After capture, toute prise doit etre jugée: all captures must be adjudicated upon by a prize 
court. The capturing commander must therefore be able to show that there is sufficient 
evidence to found a case. Fitzmaurice put it this way, “simple seizure in Prize is justified if 
there appears to be an adequate prima facie case.”493 The “adequate prima facie case” test is 
not prescribed in any of the national manuals surveyed, although it does reflect earlier 
practice in the English and Russian prize courts.494 While without doubt this reflects the 
law, this dissertation has highlighted a number of factors to show that belligerents will not 
need to rely on capture in the future, or will be reluctant to do so. These include the use of 
navicerts and diversion, and the growth in international arms control, as well as the 
logistical difficulties of storing captured vessels and cargos and accommodating captured 
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crews. Capture is onerous and difficult and it seems likely that belligerent States will avoid 
it where possible. 
 
D. Jus ad Bellum Constraints on Enforcing Maritime Neutrality Law 
 
The UK Manual, in the Introduction to the Maritime Warfare chapter, makes the following 
assertion: 
 
[T]he conduct of armed conflict . . . is subject to the limitations imposed by the UN Charter on 
all use of force. . . . [E]ven when resort to force is justified, it should not exceed what is 
necessary and proportionate to the achievement of the goal for which force may be used. In a 
conflict of limited scope, this may mean that a belligerent state is constrained, to a greater 
extent than the rules set out in this chapter might suggest, in the action that it may lawfully take 
. . . .495 
  
The UK has held this position since at least 1982, when it relied upon the jus ad bellum to 
justify specific military actions in the Falklands War rather than purely the jus in bello.496 The 
ICJ, in dicta, supports this position in the Oil Platforms decision.497  
The British government’s position has been criticized by some scholars. Heintschel von 
Heinegg considers that:  
 
[E]fforts to limit the in bello legality in the light of the jus ad bellum have been futile and cannot 
be considered as reflecting the general consensus of states. Hence, if, during an international 
armed conflict, a blockade is in compliance with the rules and principles of the law of air or 
naval warfare, its legality may not be doubted.498  
 
It is certainly true that the UK view is unique among the national manuals surveyed. On 
one view, the UK position is sensible as a matter of lex ferenda. It should ensure that all 
military operations within an armed conflict are properly addressed to the specific aims and 
objectives of the conflict. On the other, it might be dangerous in that it might place 
unnecessary constraints (dressed as legal constraints) upon commanders in their planning 
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and conduct of operations. This debate is pertinent insofar as it relates to the conduct of 
operations against the enemy without impact on neutral States. However, if a belligerent 
takes military action which involves the vessels or territory of neutral States, it is far harder 
to argue that the belligerent’s U.N. Charter obligations to the neutral State are not in play. 
Two examples illustrate the point. The first is of a neutral-flagged vessel which makes 
itself a legitimate military objective by some form of unneutral service to the enemy, thus 
rendering itself a lawful target for attack under the jus in bello. Whether a belligerent attack 
in such instances amounts to a use of force contrary to Article 2(4), requiring separate 
justification under Article 51, was discussed above.499 Whether it did or did not depended 
on the context; what was not in doubt, however, was that Charter norms applied. Just 
because an armed conflict exists between States A and B does not ipso facto justify State A 
or B in using force against neutral State C unless there is a basis in the jus ad bellum. 
The second example is where a belligerent sinks an enemy warship which is using 
neutral territorial sea as a sanctuary because the neutral State in question is unwilling or 
unable to evict the guilty warship. It cannot be doubted that the warship is a lawful target 
under the jus in bello. But the attack probably also amounts to a use of force against the 
territorial integrity of the hapless or unwilling neutral State, contrary to Article 2(4).500 Once 
again, it cannot be doubted that Charter norms apply; what is in question is the scope of 
Article 2(4) in each case. Accordingly, before taking military action against a neutral vessel 
or a belligerent vessel unlawfully present in neutral territorial sea, a belligerent State will 
need to ensure that its action complies with the jus ad bellum, as well as the specific rules of 
maritime neutrality. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has considered all aspects of maritime neutrality law, ranging from 
passage rights in territorial seas to the circumstances in which belligerents can attack 
neutral merchant vessels. This Conclusion will draw together the specific conclusions from 
each Part, before making some more general observations. 
Belligerent warships and auxiliaries do not enjoy the right of innocent passage in 
neutral territorial waters. They may, however, avail themselves of the right of mere passage 
when not prohibited or restricted by the coastal State. Mere and innocent passage appear 
very similar, but the key difference between the two is the greater discretion afforded to 
coastal States in respect of mere passage, both in permitting it in the first place and 
regulating it if they choose to permit it.  
Belligerents continue to enjoy the non-suspendable passage rights provided for in 
customary international law and/or UNCLOS. Transit passage, a creature of UNCLOS, is 
strictly applicable only where the belligerent and the neutral coastal State are parties to 
UNCLOS. The enjoyment of any passage right by a belligerent in neutral territorial sea is 
subject to the twenty-four hour rule and the prohibitions on seeking sanctuary or basing 
operations in neutral waters. 
Belligerents may, subject to the neutral State’s consent, use neutral ports for refuelling, 
revictualing and repair. Neutral States must make their port facilities available to each 
belligerent on an impartial basis. While the state of the law on how much fuel or victuals 
belligerents may take on board is uncertain, this dissertation recommends that belligerents 
should be able to top up both, but subject to a prohibition on resupply from ports of the 
same neutral State within three months. As to repairs, this dissertation favours the view 
that battle damage repairs in neutral ports ought to be forbidden by the law. 
In the area of belligerent control of trade, States, in their manuals, have preserved for 
themselves the traditional law rules on contraband. Much of the law and State practice in 
this area predates the Second World War; indeed, much of it is drawn from European 
practice during the Napoleonic Wars. Predicting how contraband measures might be 
enforced in future conflicts is, therefore, difficult. This dissertation concludes that 
belligerent States which wish to rely on contraband controls must still publish affirmative 
contraband lists. Other than the stipulated free goods, which are widely accepted, it is 
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conceded that States’ lists may be long and wide-ranging. However, the requirement to 
publish them at least provides neutral States with the opportunity to protest. The 
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has almost certainly fallen into 
desuetude. It has been replaced by an evidentiary question—is there sufficient evidence, on 
the balance of probabilities, that the goods in question will be used to sustain the enemy’s 
war effort? The enemy destination requirement for contraband is similarly a question of 
fact determined upon available evidence and any evidentiary presumptions provided for by 
the domestic prize law of the belligerent State. Practice in previous conflicts, although 
hardly recent, suggests that prize courts often find and use any evidence at all in favour of 
the belligerent captors. Second World War developments indicate that, in the future, these 
evidentiary questions (use and destination) will be in the hands not of prize courts, but 
executive officials administering a navicert regime. The advent of navicerts, coupled with 
the development of the belligerent ability to divert rather than capture shipping suspected 
of carrying contraband, is likely to spell the end of prize proceedings dealing with 
contraband carriage. 
Unlike contraband, blockade has been recently practised. Its employment by Israel in 
Lebanon and Gaza, the response of States to its use and the findings of the Turkish, Turkel 
and Palmer reports reinforced much of the traditional law of blockade. This dissertation 
has suggested that blockades should no longer be required to be enforced impartially. 
Focused, discretionary enforcement of a blockade would allow blockades to be effectively 
maintained, but with probably lesser impact on neutral traders and the population of the 
blockaded territory. Like contraband, the belligerent’s capacity to divert shipping which 
would otherwise be in breach of the blockade reduces the necessity for capture. Fewer 
captures mean fewer prize proceedings. Indeed, even where captures are effected, the 
Israeli action against the Gaza flotilla shows that prize proceedings need not necessarily 
follow—vessels, cargos and crews may simply be repatriated rather than confiscated or 
detained. Prize proceedings in the context of blockade are as unlikely these days as they are 
in respect of contraband. 
Maritime zones are a relatively new yet, in the view of this author, well-established 
belligerent right. The requirement that they take account of neutral interests, coupled with 
the absence of a rule that they be enforced impartially, mitigates to some degree their 
potential for harm to neutral freedom of trade and navigation. While this dissertation 
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postulates that capture ought to be an available mode of enforcement of maritime zones as 
much as in any other area of maritime neutrality, belligerent reluctance to effect captures 
for breach or suspected breach of other rules means capture remains an unlikely mode of 
enforcement in practice. Zones are more likely to be enforced by diversions. 
Unneutral service, the means by which neutral vessels might act partially to one 
belligerent over another, should be considered to be divided into two categories. In the 
first, unneutral service which results in liability to attack, are offending neutral vessels that 
become legitimate military targets and may be dealt with under the law of naval warfare. 
Whether an attack by a belligerent on a neutral merchant vessel amounts to a use of force 
against the neutral flag State is a complex question which will ultimately be determined by 
the facts of each case. Where it does, the belligerent State must comply not only with the 
law of naval warfare, but also with the jus ad bellum. The second category, unneutral service 
which results in liability to capture, is unashamedly a catch-all category of means by which 
neutral vessels might support one belligerent’s cause over the other’s, yet is conduct falling 
short of the high threshold for rendering themselves a lawful target for attack. Examples 
might be Internet hacking activity or complicity in some form of cyber operation. Once 
again, just because this sort of activity renders a vessel liable for capture, does not oblige the 
wronged belligerent to enforce its rights by capture—a diversion or an order to desist 
might be sufficient. 
More generally, this dissertation shows that many of the substantive rules of maritime 
neutrality have remained fundamentally unaltered since the 1909 Declaration of London. 
Of course, there have been some changes. The advent of the doctrine of maritime zones is 
the most significant. But States continue to preserve the traditional law of contraband in 
their manuals, and blockade has recently been employed in its classic terms. The concept of 
unneutral service remains recognized.  
On the other hand, the means of enforcing rules of maritime neutrality by belligerents 
is likely to be significantly different in the future. Visit and search has remained a 
stubbornly effective method of warfare, despite predictions to the contrary. Navicerts 
would reduce the need for visit and search in contraband enforcement, although they 
would still require residual visit and search enforcement. Subject to the development of 
cyber means of enforcement, maritime zones, blockades and unneutral service all rely to 
some extent on visit and search to be effective. While visit and search is likely to be 
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employed for some time to come, capture of suspect vessels has been shown to be all but 
moribund. Capturing vessels found in breach of rules is difficult, onerous and resource 
intensive. While Israel did capture the Mavi Marmara and the other vessels of the Gaza 
flotilla, the Gaza blockade was most often enforced by warnings and diversions. 
The existence of diversion simpliciter as a lawful mode of enforcement greatly reduces 
the need for captures. This dissertation does not subscribe to the view that such diversions 
may only be with the consent of the neutral master, especially as diversion for the purpose 
of visit and search is widely regarded as a lawful, non-consensual penalty. Indeed, the latter 
mode of enforcement ought to be of graver concern to neutral traders. Diversion for visit 
and search may be ordered whenever there is grounds for visit and search and to conduct it 
at sea would be impossible or unsafe—a determination in the hands of the belligerent. The 
belligerent State therefore enjoys a broad discretion to divert neutral shipping to a port 
within its domestic jurisdiction, subjecting them to its domestic laws. The only solution to 
this conundrum is to impose a higher threshold for visit and search operations, which is an 
unlikely development. 
The last observation to make is that the growth of the view that the jus ad bellum 
continues to govern belligerent activity during an armed conflict, both between the 
belligerents and their interaction with neutral States, suggests the type of conflict in which 
interference with neutral shipping might legitimately be conducted is more tightly 
constrained than ever before. The UK’s limited war in the Falklands in 1982 demonstrated 
no necessity to interdict Argentinian trade. The UK view at the time was that all belligerent 
activity against Argentina fell to be judged under Article 51 of the Charter, as well as the 
rules of naval warfare. Belligerent activity, lawful under the law of naval warfare or the 
traditional law of neutrality, would be rendered unlawful under Article 51 of the Charter if 
it was not necessary or proportionate to the limited aim of the conflict. If this view took 
hold more broadly, then enforcement of maritime neutrality rules will be a feature only of 
the most serious of conflicts. 
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